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THE CROSS AT COLLEGE: ACCOMMODATION AND
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RELIGION AT PUBLIC
UNIVERSITIES
Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle*
INTRODUCTION
In October 2006, President Gene Nichol of the College of William and Mary
ordered a change in the practice of displaying a cross in the College's Wren Chapel.'
Since the late 1930s, when Bruton Parish Church donated the cross to the College of
William and Mary (the College), the cross normally had been displayed on the chapel's
altar and removed only for secular events or non-Christian worship. 2 The brass cross
stands eighteen inches tall and is inscribed "IHS,"3 which represents the name "Jesus
* The authors are both on the law faculty of The George Washington University. Ira C.
Lupu is the F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law; Robert W. Tuttle is a Professor of
Law and the David R. and Sherry Kirschner Berz Research Professor of Law and Religion.
The authors are also Co-Directors of Legal Research for the Roundtable on Religion and Social
Welfare Policy, a non-partisan enterprise sponsored by the Pew Charitable Trusts and operated
by the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute on State and Local Government, State University of
New York. The views expressed in this Article are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Pew Charitable Trusts or the Rockefeller Institute. The authors are
very grateful for the research assistance provided by Andrea Goplerud and Katrina Montalban.
The authors thank John Taylor and Steve Green for their very helpful comments on an earlier
version of this Article.
' See Andrew Petkofsky, W&M President Reiterates Reasons for Cross Removal,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 17, 2006, at B 1; Statement from Gene Nichol, President,
William & Mary, to William & Mary Board of Visitors (Nov. 16, 2006) [hereinafter Nichol,
Statement to the Board of Visitors], available at http:llwww.wm.edu/newslindex.php?id=7026;
Email from Gene Nichol, President, College of William & Mary, to Students, Faculty, and Staff
of William & Mary (Oct. 27, 2006 15:37:16 EDT) (on file with authors and William & Mary
Bill of Rights Journal).
2 Vince Haley, Save the Wren Chapel: An Astounding Bit of Blabberfrom the President
of William and Mary, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Nov. 17, 2006, available at http://article.national
review.com/?q=NTk3Njc2MWM50WNjZmY3MmNjYzUzMGJiNjZ1ZWFiY2E=; Letter
from Susan Godson, Church Historian, Bruton Parish Church (Nov. 11, 2006) (on file with
authors and William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal) (describing the history of the Wren
Chapel cross).
3 See At William & Mary, A Cross Becomes a Lightning Rod, WASH. POST, Feb. 18,2007,
at B8 (describing the cross and its history). For a picture of the cross, see Alexandra Cochrane,
Nichol Defends Cross Removal at BOVMeeting, FLAT HAT (Wm. & Mary), Nov. 29, 2006,
available at http://www.flathatnews.com/news/l 02/nichol-defends-cross-removal-at-bov-
meeting.
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Christ."4 Nichol concluded that the permanent display of the cross on the altar treated
non-Christian members of the College community as outsiders.5 He directed that the
cross should be removed from the display in the chapel except "during appropriate
religious services." 6
On campus and beyond, the decision sparked an intense controversy. 7 Oppo-
nents charged that the decision reflected hypersensitivity to those who were alleg-
edly offended by the display and effectively sacrificed the tradition of the College
to "political correctness." 8 Some claimed that Nichol's decision represented hostil-
ity to Christianity, or even to religion in general, by attempting to erase the chapel's
spiritual heritage. 9 Alumni of the College drafted and circulated a petition-which
eventually gathered well over ten thousand signatures-asking that the decision be
reversed.' ° Several opponents publicly asked for Nichol's resignation, and one donor
4 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1323 (6th ed. 2007).
' See Nichol, Statement to the Board of Visitors, supra note 1; see also Gene R. Nichol,
Balancing Tradition and Inclusion: Behind W&M's Cross Controversy, VIRGINtAN-PLOT
(Norfolk), Dec. 24, 2006, at J I [hereinafter Nichol, Balancing Tradition]; Petkofsky, supra
note 1, at B 1.
6 Nichol, Balancing Tradition, supra note 5, at J1.
7 See, e.g., Shawn Day, Wren Cross Feud Waged on Web, DAILY PRESS (Newport News,
Va.), June 21, 2007, at A1; Fredrick Kunkle, School's Move Toward Inclusion Creates a Rift:
Upset About Cross's Removal, William and Mary Alumni Mount Online Protest, WASH. POST,
Dec. 26, 2006, at B 1.
8 Natasha Altamirano, Bow to Diversity Leaves Altar Empty: William & Mary Removes
Cross from "Equally Open" Wren Chapel, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 29,2007, at Al; George Harris,
The Bishop, the Statesman, and the Wren Cross: A Lesson in American Secularism, 67
HUMANIST, July-Aug. 2007, at 37 (describing a petition from opponents of President
Nichol's decision); Posting of Lisa M. to Regent's Voice, http://regentsvoice.blogspot
.coni/2007/01/ wren-cross-compromise-is-not-enough.htnl (Jan. 13, 2007, 10:50 EST)
[hereinafter Regent's Voice].
9 See Will Coggin, Op-Ed., Does President Nichol's Agenda Call for Secularizing
College?, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 18, 2006, at A9; Haley, supra note 2; Matthew
D. Staver, Cross of William and Mary, CAMPUS REPORTONLINE.NET, Dec. 5, 2006, http://
www.campusreportonline.netlmain/articles.php?id= 1372; see also Letter from Erik W. Stanley,
Liberty Counsel, to Gene Nichol, President, College of William & Mary (Dec. 1, 2006),
available at http:/lc.orglattachments/ltr wrrk-mary-pross_120106.pdf (arguing that removal
of cross from altar of Wren Chapel reflects hostility to Christianity).
'0 Fredrick Kunkle, Cross Returns to Chapel-But Not on the Altar, WASH. POST,
Mar. 7, 2007, at B6 (stating that there were 17,000 signatures on the petition). The petition
was located on a website that has since been discontinued, http://www.savethewrencross.org.
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revoked a large pledge to the College." An outraged alumnus even filed a lawsuit,
ultimately unsuccessful, challenging the removal of the cross.'2
In response to this outpouring of criticism, Nichol appointed a Committee on
Religion at a Public University to study the questions raised by the ongoing con-
troversy over the chapel. 3 The committee, comprised of faculty, students, and alumni
of the College, 4 eventually recommended a compromise solution. The cross would
be returned to permanent display in the chapel, but the cross would not be placed on
the chapel altar except on Sundays or during Christian worship services. 5 At all other
times, the cross would be located in a glass case and accompanied by a plaque describ-
ing the historical significance of the chapel and cross.16 Nichol and the College's
Board of Visitors embraced the compromise, and many opponents seemed to accept
the resolution. 7 The now-encased cross is located toward the front of the chapel,
1' W&M Takes Comments on Nichol's Performance, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH,
Sept. 29, 2007, at B8 (noting that William & Mary accepted public comments on renewing
President Nichol's contract soon after the Wren cross controversy); Andrew Petkofsky,
W&M Donor Cancels Pledge, Cites Wren Cross: Loss of $10 Million Donation Sets Back
College Fundraising Campaign, RICHMONDTIMES-DiSPATCH, Mar. 1, 2007, at Al. Opponents
of Nichol had a website, on which they argued for his removal. See Should Gene Nichol Be
President at William & Mary?, http://shouldnicholberenewed.org (last visited Jan. 26,2008);
see also Letter from Karla L. Bruno to Michael Powell, Rector, Board of Visitors, College of
William and Mary (Apr. 11,2007), http://savethewrencross.blogspot.com/2007/04/ request-to-
bov-let-gene-nichol.html. President Nichol resigned from office on February 12,2008, effective
immediately, after being informed that his contract would not be renewed. See infra Epilogue.
12 Leach v. Nichol, No. 4:07cv12, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38763 (E.D. Va. May 29,2007),
affid, No. 07-1630,2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 27857 (4th Cir. Dec. 3,2007); Shawn Day, Judge
Dismisses Wren Cross Lawsuit, DAILY PRESS (Newport News, Va.), June 20, 2007; Carol
Scott, W&M Grad Sues for Cross' Permanent Return: A Scholar Said a First Amendment
LawsuitAgainst the College of William and Mary Would Be Frivolous, DAILY PRESS (Newport
News, Va.), Feb. 13, 2007, at C2.
1" Bill Geroux, W&M Will Revisit Debate About Cross: Nichol Wants Group to Study Role
of Religion in Public Universities, RICHMONDTIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 26, 2007, atB2. Details
about the William and Mary Committee on Religion at a Public University are available on-
line. Religion at a Public University, http://www.wm.edu/committee on-religion (last visited
Jan. 26, 2008).
See Religion at a Public University, supra note 13.
'5 Joint Statement of the Board of Visitors and the President (Mar. 6,2007), available at
http://www.wm.edu/cormittee-on-religion/statements/bovpresmar6.php; see also Kunkle,
supra note 10, at B 1.
16 Joint Statement of the Board of Visitors and the President, supra note 15.
'7 Id.; see also Natasha Altamirano, Return of Cross Quiets Debate at William & Mary,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2007, at B 1; Kunkle, supra note 10, at B 1; Andrew Petkofsky, W&M
to Return Cross to Chapel: Panel's Compromise Restores Wren Cross, Welcomes Other
Religious Objectsfor Display, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 7, 2007, at Al; Statement
of Save the Wren Chapel Cross, http://web.archive.org/web/20070702051010/wwwsavethe
wrencross.org/stwcstatement.php (last visited Jan. 26, 2008).
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against the side wall and just outside the chancel rail. 8 In this location, the cross is
barely visible to those who enter through the chapel's narthex, although it can be
easily seen from the front of the nave.' 9
The controversy over the Wren Chapel cross provides an especially useful prism
for exploring three facets of contemporary Establishment Clause law, all of which
figured prominently in the arguments about removal of the cross. After a sketch in
Part I of relevant portions of the College's history, including its transition from a pri-
vate college to a state institution, we turn to the three facets of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence illuminated by the dispute. Part 11 addresses the foundational question
of that jurisprudence-against what type of injury or injuries does the Establishment
Clause protect? President Nichol defended his decision in terms of concern for those
who might feel excluded by display of the cross.2' Opponents argued that such feelings
of exclusion are not the kind of injuries that deserve attention or redress.21 Because
students could have the cross removed for particular events and the university never
required any student to use the chapel, display of the cross injured no one.22
These rival positions on injury closely track the two dominant positions in the
contemporary law of the Establishment Clause. These competing positions were on
display most recently and importantly in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation,
Inc. ,23 the Supreme Court's decision limiting taxpayer standing to bring suit under
the Clause. As the Wren Chapel controversy amply illustrates, the emphasis on indi-
vidualized injury in Establishment Clause discourse seriously misconstrues key ele-
ments of the Clause's history, doctrine, and normative focus. Although the Clause has
a role to play in protecting individual religious liberty, it has an equal or more impor-
tant role as a structural limitation on government jurisdiction over religion, including
the authority to promote religion.
The remainder of this Article explores how that structural limitation should be
applied in the context of the display of the Wren Chapel cross. In Part Il, we assess
the first of the two theories that might support at least some version of the contin-
ued display of the Wren Chapel cross. Drawing on a rich and complex theme in
18 Alexandra Cochrane, Cross Placement Decided, FLAT HAT (Wm. & Mary), Apr. 17,
2007, available at http://www.flathatnews.com/news/787/cross-placement-decided.
'" See Bill Geroux, Wren Cross Is Returned to William and Mary Chapel: In a
Compromise, It's Now in a Display Case Bearing a Plaque, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Aug. 4, 2007, at B8. The narthex is the entrance area farthest from the altar; the nave is the
section in which the congregation sits. SHORTER OXFORD DICTIONARY 1887, 1893 (6th ed.
2007).
20 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
21 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
22 Haley, supra note 2.
23 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007). For our analysis of Hein, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. and the Future of
Establishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 BYU L. REV. 115.
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Establishment Clausejurisprudence, opponents of President Nichol' s decision asserted
that public display of the cross did not favor Christianity, but simply accommodated
the religious needs of Christian students.24 This assertion highlights uncertainties
about how Establishment Clause standards should be applied to public universities
and in particular to chapel and chaplaincy programs in those institutions. In some set-
tings, such as healthcare facilities and the military, government enjoys constitutional
discretion to facilitate private religious experience. But that discretion is bounded.
Government conduct that purports to accommodate religion nonetheless may violate
the Establishment Clause if such facilitation affirmatively promotes the practice of
one or more faiths or imposes unnecessary burdens on those who do not participate
in the accommodated religious activity. 26 Viewed in light of the Supreme Court's
criteria for assessing permissible accommodations of religion, the university's support
for the chapel itself is defensible, but the traditional Wren Chapel cross display on
the chapel's altar would be open to serious challenge. As we explain in this Part, dis-
play of the Wren Chapel cross on the altar as a default position-in that place unless
special reason exists to temporarily displace it--confers a special privilege on one faith
and does not alleviate a discernible religious burden on Christian students. The
theory of religious accommodation thus does not support opponents of President
Nichol' s decision.
In Part IV, we turn to the second theory that might support continued display of
the cross-the claim that government may acknowledge religion without running
afoul of the Establishment Clause. The claim invokes the Supreme Court's opinions
on public display of religious images and messages, under which the Court has ap-
proved religious messages within holiday displays and other monuments as long as
such messages reflect governmental "acknowledgment of our religious heritage,"
27
rather than positive endorsement of the religious content of the messages. Those
who opposed the change asserted that the cross's prior location on the chapel's altar
acknowledged the role of Christianity, and especially the Anglican tradition, in the
history of the College.28
The idea of acknowledgment can be disentangled into three discrete strands-
historical accuracy, reverence, and cultural recognition. Until quite recently, the
Supreme Court's opinions had not called attention to the multiplicity of meanings
inherent in the concept, but Justice Scalia's dissent in McCreary County v. ACLU
of Kentucky29 has now brought this ambiguity to the forefront of debates over the
Establishment Clause.
24 See, e.g., supra note 9 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 194, 264-66 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 225-50 and accompanying text.
27 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 677 (1984).
28 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
29 545 U.S. 844, 885-912 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The Wren Chapel cross controversy provides a particularly useful setting for
exploring and clarifying distinctions among the strands. We argue that the concept
of acknowledgment as historical accuracy poses relatively few problems under the
Establishment Clause, but the Wren Chapel cross, when placed upon the altar, has
little claim to historical provenance within the chapel. The concept of acknowledg-
ment as reverence could provide a sufficient basis for permanent placement of the
cross on the Wren Chapel altar, but this interpretation of "acknowledgment" has little
support in present Establishment Clause doctrine, and even the most ambitious ac-
count of reverential acknowledgment would not permit display of a specific tradition's
sacred symbol. Therefore, acknowledgment as reverence provides supporters of that
placement with no basis for their position. Finally, acknowledgment as cultural rec-
ognition provides a slightly more plausible explanation for continued display of the
Wren Chapel cross, but this version of acknowledgment depends on a secular justifi-
cation for display of religious images, and there is no such justification for permanent
display of the cross on the Wren Chapel altar.
Ultimately, we argue that the compromise agreement reached by the president,
Board of Visitors, and Committee on Religion is more than simply a pragmatic settle-
ment of a contentious question. This agreement manifests the concept of acknowl-
edgment as historical accuracy, while simultaneously attesting to the Establishment
Clause's limits on government promotion of a particular faith.
I. BACKGROUND-RELIGION AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE COLLEGE OF
WILLIAM AND MARY
The controversy over the Wren Chapel cross reflects a serious debate over the
present role of religion in a public university. The College of William and Mary's
1693 charter,3° however, suggested no uncertainty about the importance of religion
in that institution's founding. The charter, granted by King William m and Queen
Mary 1I of England, identified three purposes for the College. 3' First, it would supply
ministers to the Church of England in Virginia.32 Second, it would provide a place
"that the [y]outh may be piously educated in good letters and manners. '33 Third, it
would spread the Gospel among the "Western Indians."'
The 1693 charter is illuminating for many reasons, but especially because it
so clearly demonstrates the union of religion and government after the Glorious
30 THE CHARTER OF THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY, IN VIRGINIA [hereinafter
CHARTER], in THE HISTORY OF THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY FROM ITS FOUNDATION,
1660, TO 1874, at 3-16 (Richmond, J.W. Randolph & English 1874).
31 See CHARTER, supra note 30, at pmbl.; see also WILFORD KALE, HARK UPON THE
GALE: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY 17 (2d ed. 2007).
32 CHARTER, supra note 30, at para. 2; KALE, supra note 31, at 17.
33 CHARTER, supra note 30, at para. 2; KALE, supra note 31, at 17.
31 CHARTER, supra note 30, at para. 2; KALE, supra note 31, at 17.
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Revolution. 5 In the charter's provisions, the crown asserted responsibility over the
religious education and spiritual welfare of its citizens, as well as the spread of
Christianity to non-believers. 36 The concern for religion pervades the charter and
appears in virtually every discussion of the content of instruction at the College.37
Moreover, the charter promised substantial royal subsidies for the College. In
addition to a direct payment for the construction of the College,38 the charter assigned
to the College revenues from a portion of the tax on tobacco exports from Virginia
and Maryland, 39 as well as rents from certain royal lands.' The charter also conferred
on the College the office of royal surveyor in Virginia, which carried the right to
collect fees from those-including, in 1747, George Washington-it licensed to
conduct surveys in the colony.4'
Finally, the unity of church and state are most fully expressed in the charter's
provisions for governance of the College. The document granted authority over the
school to an independent body,4 2 originally functioning as trustees and later as a cor-
porate board, which was empowered to make regulations for the school provided
such regulations did not conflict with the laws of the realm "or to the canons and
35 See Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the
Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1412-14 (discussing the history of church
and state in post-1688 England and the Church of England during the reign of William and
Mary); Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishment ofReligion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2105,2160-61 (2003); Joel A. Nichols,
Religious Liberty in the Thirteenth Colony: Church-State Relations in Colonial and Early
National Georgia, 80 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1693, 1707-08 (2005); Hugh Trevor-Roper, Toleration
and Religion After 1688, in FROM PERSECUTION TO TOLERATION (0. Grell et al. eds., 1991);
Laura Zwicker, Note, The Politics of Toleration: The Establishment Clause and the Act of
Toleration Examined, 66 IND. L.J. 773, 773-83 (1991).
36 KALE, supra note 31, at 17.
37 CHARTER, supra note 30, at pmbl., para. 1. On the College of William & Mary and the
Anglican establishment, see GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSrrY:
FROM PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT TO ESTABUSHED NONBELIEF 54 (1994).
38 CHARTER, supra note 30, at para. 14.
39 Id. at para. 15.
40 Id. at para. 17.
Id. at para. 16. On Washington's licensing by the college, see KALE, supra note 31, at 48.
42 The charter granted the original powers to trustees who held property for the College
until the College was sufficiently well established to possess a separate legal identity. At that
point, in 1729, the trustees transferred ownership of the property to the College, and a Board
of Visitors was elected to exercise governance in the name of the College. See THE TRANSFER
OF THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY, IN VIRGINIA, in HISTORY OF WILLIAM AND MARY,
supra note 30, at 17-33 (transferring control of the college from the trustees to a Board of
Visitors); see also PARKE ROUSE, JR., A HOUSE FOR A PRESIDENT: 250 YEARS ON THE
CAMPUS OF THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY 12 (1983). The Board of Visitors, as
specified in the charter, functioned as a self-perpetuating body until the College became a
state institution in 1907, at which point the Governor of Virginia received authority to name
Visitors. Id. at 154-55.
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constitutions of the Church of England, by law established., 43 The initial trustees
were elected by Virginia's General Assembly and included the Lieutenant Governor
of the colony, Francis Nicholson, and James Blair, the Bishop of London's represen-
tative (commissary) in Virginia.44 In addition to the authority granted to the visitors,
the charter gave the College's president and faculty a specifically political right-the
power to select a representative in the General Assembly.45
Blair, a Scots-born clergyman then serving in Henrico parish, was named the first
President of the College, "during his natural life," as well as first rector (or chair) of
the trustees. 46 He served as president for fifty years, until his death in 1743. 47 Blair,
like six presidents who would follow him, also held the rectorate of Bruton Parish
Church during his tenure in office and continued his position as commissary of the
Bishop of London.48 In addition, Blair, followed by four of his pre-Revolution
successors as president, served on the Governor's Council, which combined judicial,
administrative, and legislative functions within the colony.49
Work on the College's main building, now called the Sir Christopher Wren
Building, commenced soon after the charter was granted, yet it was not ready for use
until 1700.0 An early eighteenth-century source attributed the building to the famous
architect Sir Christopher Wren,51 and although the evidence for the attribution is scant,
arguments for Wren's involvement in the design are at least plausible.52 The College
was originally planned as a quadrangle, but a shortage of funds limited construction
41 CHARTER, supra note 30, at para. 9.
4 Blair and Nicholson were the most important figures in the establishment of the College.
JAMES D. KORNWOLF, "So GOOD A DESIGN:" THE COLONIAL CAMPUS OF THE COLLEGE OF
WILLIAM AND MARY: ITS HISTORY, BACKGROUND, AND LEGACY 13-22 (1989). As com-
missary, Blair was the most powerful ecclesiastical official in the colony because the Church
of England did not have a bishop serving in the colony-indeed, no bishop served anywhere
in North America. KALE, supra note 31, at 21-22. Instead, the parishes in the colonies came
under the jurisdiction of the Bishop of London. Id.
45 CHARTER, supra note 30, at para. 18.
46 Id. at para. 3.
4' KALE, supra note 31, at 43.
48 Four of Blair's six successors before the American Revolution also held the position
of commissary-William Dawson, Thomas Dawson, James Horrocks, and John Camm. Past
Presidents, http://www.wm.edu/president/past.eighteen.php (last visited Feb. 14, 2008); see
ROUSE, supra note 42, at 21-73; see also HAROLD WICKLIFFE ROSE, THE COLONIALHOUSES
OF WORSHIP IN AMERICA: BuILT IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES BEFORE THE REPUBLIC,
1607-1789, AND STILL STANDING 15-16 (1963) (discussing the role of commissary); id. at
455 ("Eight presidents of the college have been rectors of Bruton Parish Church.").
41 Past Presidents, supra note 48. They were William Dawson, Thomas Dawson, William
Yates, and John Camm. Id.; see also ROUSE, supra note 42, at 21-73.
50 See KALE, supra note 31, at 31.
51 KORNWOLF, supra note 44, at 44-45.
52 See KALE, supra note 31, at 27-28; KoRNWoLF, supra note 44, at 44-49.
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to only two sides, the east range-the main classroom and residence quarters-and the
north wing, which contained the Great Hall.53
In 1699, the Virginia General Assembly solidified William and Mary's union be-
tween church and state when it decided to relocate the colonial capital from Jamestown
to the new site of the College, previously called Middle Plantation but now renamed
Williamsburg.54 Loss of the previous capitol building to fire prompted the decision,
and from 1700-1704 the General Assembly met in the Great Hall of the College while
a new capitol was under construction." The legislature would return to the College
from 1747-1753 while the new capitol was rebuilt after another fire.56
Although King William and Queen Mary granted the charter in 1693 and a gram-
mar school began operation soon thereafter, the College did not hire any professors
until twenty years later.5 7 This delay was caused at least in part by a 1705 fire that
destroyed the College building.58 Reconstruction did not begin in earnest until 1710
and was not completed until 1716 .59 By the 1720s, however, the College had gained
sufficient momentum that President Blair arranged for construction of the College's
south wing, which contained the chapel. 6° The building was completed and the chapel
consecrated in 1732.61
Between the 1720s and the 1770s, the College maintained its close bond with
the Church of England. As required by the College's regulations, all presidents of the
College during this period were ordained clergy of the Church of England and most
faculty were as well.62 Bishops of London served as chancellors of the school.63 The
divinity school operated during this period, although it apparently failed to generate
" The south wing, containing the chapel, was completed in 1732; the west range was never
completed. See KALE, supra note 31, at 29,41; KORNWOLF, supra note 44, at 36-56; ROUSE,
supra note 42, at 10, 12-13.
KALE, supra note 31, at 29.
5 Id. at 31.
56 Id. at 45.
" See Lyon G. Tyler, Early Courses and Professors at William and Mary College, Address
to the Phi Beta Kappa Society, William and Mary College (Dec. 5, 1904), in 14 WM. &MARY
Q. 71 (1905); see also KALE, supra note 31, at 35.
5 See KALE, supra note 31, at 31; KORNWOLF, supra note 44, at 43-44; see also Historical
Sketch of the College of William and Mary, in Virginia [hereinafter Historical Sketch], in
HISTORY OF WILLIAM AND MARY, supra note 30, at 34, 40.
" KALE, supra note 31, at 35. An Indian school also operated at the College after 1712.
Id. at 37-39. Like the divinity school, enrollment in the Indian school appears not to have
matched expectations. See id. at 39.
60 Id. at 40-41; ROUSE, supra note 42, at 12.
61 Historical Sketch, supra note 58, at 41, 43; KALE, supra note 31, at 41; ROUSE, supra
note 42, at 12.
62 See KALE, supra note 31, at 41.
63 ROUSE, supra note 42, at 225 app. 1 (listing chancellors of the College).
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a significant number of new clergy for the church; records indicate that fewer than
forty graduates of the divinity school received ordination. 6'
The American Revolution brought dramatic changes to the College because both
England and the Anglican Church withdrew support. The crown ended its substantial
funding of the College, leaving the school with only the rent from relatively unproduc-
tive land, along with the office of surveyor, which the College seems to have retained
well into the nineteenth century. 65 Once among the wealthiest of institutions in the
colonies, the College was reduced to an annual budget of around a tenth of its former
income.66 The new government of Virginia provided little help, and its decision in
1780 to move the state capital to Richmond left Williamsburg as something of a back-
water.67 Hopes for state assistance dimmed even further when, in 1786, Virginia
enacted the Statute for Religious Freedom, which prohibited all use of tax funds to
subsidize religion.68
Support from the church waned as well, in large part because of the end of royal
support for the established church in Virginia. In 1779, facing a continuing loss of
revenue, Thomas Jefferson-governor of Virginia, member of the Board of Visitors,
and former student at the College-proposed a radical revision of the College's curric-
ulum, which the visitors and faculty largely accepted.69 The reform abolished the
divinity school and replaced those professorships with ones in law and medicine.
70
But the visitors rejected Jefferson's proposal to make the College a state institution.7'
The course in medicine did not last long, although the lectures in law provided a
financial mainstay for the institution until the Civil War.72
61 Id. at 34-35.
65 Historical Sketch, supra note 58, at 46-47; KALE, supra note 31, at 57-60; ROUSE,
supra note 42, at 77-85. On the extension of the surveyor's office after the Revolution and
disestablishment, see The Rev. John Bracken v. The Visitors of Win. & Mary College, 7 Va.
(3 Call) 573, 593 (1790) (discussing surveyor's office in John Marshall's argument for the
College, appearing before the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in a lawsuit concerning the
powers of the College).
66 ROUSE, supra note 42, at 79-80.
67 KALE, supra note 31, at 60.
68 Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, http://vahistorical.org/sva2003/vsrf.htm (last
visited Feb. 14, 2008). The circumstances that led to this enactment are described in detail in
the various opinions in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). For additional detail
on the effects of disestablishment on the Anglican Church in Virginia, see generally David L.
Holmes, The Decline and Revival of the Church of Virginia, in UP FROM INDEPENDENCE: THE
EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN VIRGINIA 45-109 (The Interdiocesan Bicentennial Committee of the
Virginias ed., 1976).
69 See MARSDEN, supra note 37, at 70; Tyler, supra note 57, at 76-78; see also DAVID L.
HOLMES, THE FArrHs OFTHE FOUNDING FATHERS 85 (2006); KALE, supra note 31, at 57-59;
ROUSE, supra note 42, at 77-79.
70 Tyler, supra note 57, at 76.
7' KALE, supra note 31, at 59.
72 Id. at 76.
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The College retained its close ties with the Episcopal Church-the new name for
the Anglican church in the American republic-but that church was hardly thriving
in the years following the Revolution.73 Even before the war, Anglicanism had been
overshadowed by the rapid growth of evangelical movements, such as the Baptists
and Methodists, following the First Great Awakening.74 As patriotic fervor grew,
support for the royal church withered even more. Few clergy could be gathered for
meetings of the newly-organized Episcopal Diocese of Virginia, though in 1790 they
managed to elect Virginia's first bishop and chose the Rev. James Madison, president
of the College of William and Mary since 1777 and second-cousin of the more famous
Virginian.75 For the next twenty years, Madison held both the college presidency and
the office of bishop.76
Although Madison was highly regarded, neither institution thrived during the
period.77 At Madison's death in 1812, the College had only forty-four students,7 com-
pared to three times that number a half-century earlier.79 Just over a decade later, that
number had dropped by another half, down to twenty-one students in the College, and
prospects for improvement looked bleak.80 Having failed to transform William and
Mary into a secular state university, Jefferson founded the University of Virginia in
Charlottesville in 1825.81 Other religious denominations were also establishing col-
leges in Virginia during this period, including the Presbyterians (Hampden-Sydney
in 1783)82 Baptists (University of Richmond in 1830),83 and Methodists (Randolph
Macon in 1830),' further reducing the potential student pool for William and Mary.
Notwithstanding this competition, enrollment at the College rebounded during
the 1830s, owing at least in part to the improving fortunes of the Episcopal Diocese
73 See EDWARD LEWIS GOODWIN, THE COLONIAL CHURCH IN VIRGINIA 141-44 (1927);
MARK A. NoLL, AMERICA'S GOD: FROM JONATHAN EDWARDS TO ABRAHAM LINCOLN 120-22
(2002) (describing Anglicanism in America after the Revolution). See generally HOLMES, supra
note 69, passim (detailing effects of disestablishment on the Anglican Church in Virginia).
4 NOLL, supra note 73, at 120-22.
7 GOODWIN, supra note 73, at 141-44; ROUSE, supra note 42, at 92; William Meade
Bishop, Episcopal Church, Address to the Convention (May 22, 1845), in JOURNAL OF THE
CONVENTION OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OF VIRGINIA 13-17
(1845) (describing the early history of the diocese and service by James Madison as bishop);
see also Past Presidents, supra note 48.
76 See Past Presidents, supra note 48.
7 See KALE, supra note 31, at 67-68; NOLL, supra note 73, at 120-22.
78 KALE, supra note 31, at 69.
79 See id. at 47.
80 ROUSE, supra note 42, at 99.
81 See HOLMES, supra note 69, at 85; KALE, supra note 31, at 70-73; MARSDEN, supra
note 37, at 70; ROUSE, supra note 42, at 98-100.
82 MARSDEN, supra note 37, at 70; ROUSE, supra note 42, at 100.
83 See Ray McAllister, Schools of Thought on 175 Years, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Mar. 3, 2005, at B 1.
4 See id.
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in Virginia and the leadership of Adam Empie, a renowned preacher who became
the College president in 1827 and served until 1836.85 Empie restored the chapel and
revived the practice of daily prayer before classes.16 During and after Empie's ser-
vice, the College enjoyed a period of relative prosperity,8 7 but sharp disagreements
between the faculty and visitors in the mid-1840s led to suspension of classes for the
1848-1849 academic year and the removal of all but one of the College faculty. 8 The
College reopened under the leadership of another prominent Episcopalian cleric, John
Johns, who was then serving as assistant to the Virginia bishop, and would later be-
come the fourth bishop of the Virginia diocese. 9 Johns and his successor, Benjamin
Ewell, managed to recruit a new faculty and return enrollment to sustainable levels
during the 1850s, but the College suffered another serious blow in 1859 when the
main building burned down.'
A new building, in an Italianate style quite different from the original, was quickly
erected.91 The College had scarcely resumed classes in 1860, however, before they
were suspended in 1861 at the commencement of the Civil War, which brought more
hardship to the College. 92 In 1862, Union forces occupying the town burned the
newly-constructed college building, and it was not rebuilt until 1869. 9 The College
attempted to resume classes in the fall of 1865, but the lack of a college building,
coupled with perilous economic conditions in the post-war South, led to another sus-
pension of classes in 1868.' 4 Although the College reopened in 1869, it continued to
struggle with low enrollment and suspended classes again in the fall of 1881, when
it had only a dozen students. 95 The College remained closed until 1888.96
The post-war years also brought about a subtle shift in the College's relationship
with the Episcopal Church. After Bishop Johns, no cleric held the college presidency
and few ordained clergy served as professors, especially after the College's reopen-
ing in 1888. 9 7 Indeed, one exception illustrates the shift. In 1892, the College hired
85 KALE, supra note 31, at 73-76. Enrollment continued to increase under Thomas Roderick
Dew, an alumnus and faculty member who became president in 1836. Id. at 76.
86 ROUSE, supra note 42, at 102.
87 KALE, supra note 31, at 76-78.
88 ROUSE, supra note 42, at 114.
89 See KALE, supra note 31, at 78-83.
9 KALE, supra note 31, at 82-85; ROUSE, supra note 42, at 121-22; Historical Sketch,
supra note 58, at 54-56.
"' KALE, supra note 31, at 83-85 (including sketches of the 1859 building); ROUSE, supra
note 42, at 122; Historical Sketch, supra note 58, at 56-57.
92 KALE, supra note 31, at 86.
93 Id. at 86-88.
94 Id. at 88.
95 Id. at 90; ROUSE, supra note 42, at 138.
96 ROUSE, supra note 42, at 138.
9' See KALE, supra note 31, at 123-27 (describing the increased focus on academic
programs); Past Presidents, http://www.wm.edu/president/past/twenty.php (last visited Feb.
14, 2008).
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Charles Edward Bishop to teach Greek and French.98 Bishop was a Presbyterian
minister and had been educated at European universities." Those two aspects of his
biography reflect parallels between William and Mary and other Protestant colleges
during the late nineteenth century. The model of scientific and objective higher edu-
cation drawn from European models permeated many institutions of higher education
during the period."° That model was hostile to more traditional or evangelical expres-
sion of religious piety but was compatible with the newly emergent liberal Protestant
faith, which emphasized its non-denominational character.' O' A Presbyterian minister
teaching at an Episcopalian school would have seemed commonplace in this culture
of non-denominational Protestantism."'2
An excerpt from the College's rules, taken from around 1875, provides the best
description of the school's embrace of an inclusive Protestant faith. The rules required
students to attend daily prayers in the chapel and church on Sundays.103 But the rules
allowed students to select the particular church they would attend: "All students are
expected to attend church on Sunday morning. They may indulge their religious pref-
erences by choosing between the churches of the different religious denominations in
Williamsburg; which preference shall be made known at the time of matriculation."' '4
By around 1900, even the daily chapel prayers had taken on a non-denominational
cast, as clergy from the churches in town were invited to lead on a rotating basis.'05
In 1888, the College reopened with a new source of funding and a new gover-
nance structure."° After several failed attempts, proponents of the institution secured
partial state funding as a teacher's college, and these funds gave the governor the right
to appoint ten members of a new twenty-one member Board of Visitors.'0 7 The funds
gave new life to the College, but the board soon divided between the newly-appointed
state representatives and the successors of the charter board, with each fighting for
control over the College's direction.' 08 The conflict was finally resolved in 1906
when the state accepted full control over the institution.' 9 All of its assets were
transferred to the state, and the governor was granted power to appoint the new
Board of Visitors."0
98 ROUSE, supra note 42, at 145.
99 Id.
'00 MARSDEN, supra note 37, at 101-21.
'0' See id. at 167-80.
102 See id.
103 Extracts from the Laws of the College of William and Mary [hereinafter Extracts], in
HISTORY OF WILLIAM AND MARY, supra note 30, at 178-79.
lO4 Id.
105 PARKE ROUSE, JR., COWS ON THE CAMPUS: WILLIAMSBURG IN BYGONE DAYS 119
(1973).
"o KALE, supra note 31, at 91; ROUSE, supra note 42, at 143.
107 KALE, supra note 31, at 91.
108 Id. at 100.
"09 Id. at 102.
"o Id.; ROUSE, supra note 42, at 154-55.
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Nevertheless the College's relationship with the Episcopal Church, and espe-
cially with Bruton Parish Church, did not end when the state assumed control of the
institution."' W.A.R. Goodwin, a former rector of Bruton Parish, proved to be one
of the most influential figures in the development of the College. While at Bruton
Parish from 1903 to 1909, Goodwin raised funds for and supervised the restoration
of that church, a project that formed only part of his overall vision for restoring
Williamsburg and the College." 2 After serving a parish in New York, Goodwin
returned to Williamsburg in 1923, lured by President J.A.C. Chandler, who offered
Goodwin a teaching position at the College in biblical literature and religious edu-
cation, as well as a chance to raise funds for the restoration and expansion of the
College." 3 Within a few years, Goodwin had convinced John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to
finance the restoration of the College's original buildings." 4 Full restoration of the
main building, renamed the Sir Christopher Wren Building, was completed in 1931
and returned the structure as closely as possible to a mid-eighteenth century appear-
ance."5 Rockefeller's involvement with Goodwin and the College projects ultimately
led to his decision to underwrite the restoration of Colonial Williamsburg" 6 and thus
created the setting upon which the College draws for much of its character.
The architects of the 1931 restoration gave the interior of the College chapel an
appearance consistent with mid-eighteenth century Anglican parishes, except that the
pews were arranged perpendicular to the altar (as a choir, facing across the central
aisle), in the manner of English college chapels.' The chancel is surrounded by a
simple altar rail, within which is located the wooden communion table." 8 The chapel,
paneled in dark wood, is adorned with plaques commemorating those who are buried
under the chapel, along with the royal coat of arms of Georgian vintage." 9
Sometime between 1938 and 1940, Bruton Parish donated its altar cross to the
Wren Chapel, because the parish received a new altar cross after undergoing substantial
..' The rector of Bruton Parish was a particularly vocal opponent of the state takeover of
William and Mary, and his opposition created significant conflict between the College and the
church and even within the vestry of the church. ROUSE, supra note 42, at 152-54.
12 KALE, supra note 31, at 126; ROUSE, supra note 42, at 180-81.
113 ROUSE, supra note 42, at 180-82.
114 Id.
.. See id. at 183; see also KORNWOLF, supra note 44, at 60-65 (including floor plans
showing the difference before and after the 1932 restoration of the chapel).
116 See ROUSE, supra note 42, at 182.
17 KORNWOLF, supra note 44, at 64. Compare the present interior of the chapel with its
Victorian appearance, which may be seen in KALE, supra note 31, at 95.
118 The College has a video of the chapel interior available at Virtual Tour of the Wren
Chapel, http://www.wm.edu/about/wren/wrenchapel/htmls/virtualtour.html (last visited
Feb. 16, 2008).
19 VERNON PURDUE DAVIS & JAMES SCOTt RAWINGS, THE COLONIAL CHURCHES OF
VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, AND NORTH CAROLINA: THEIR INTERIORS AND WORSHIP 60 (1985);
Virtual Tour of the Wren Chapel, supra note 118.
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renovations. 120 The cross donated by Bruton Parish had originally been given to the
church in 1907, after the Goodwin-led restoration, in memory of John and Sara Ann
Millington.12 1 John Millington had been a professor of chemistry and engineering at
the College during the 1830s, as well as a vestryman at Bruton Parish. 122 From the
time that it was donated by Bruton Parish until the fall of 2006, the Wren Chapel cross
remained on the chapel altar, except when the chapel was used for secular events, non-
Christian religious services, or when those who used the chapel specifically requested
its removal. 1
23
To summarize-the College of William and Mary has over its history metamor-
phosed from a royal institution, chartered by the British crown, to a private institution
under the control of the Episcopal Diocese of Virginia, and finally to an institution
wholly owned and operated by the State of Virginia since early in the twentieth cen-
tury. The College chapel has existed since the school's royal phase but was restored
in the twentieth century-after the onset of full state control-in an architectural style
consistent with eighteenth century Anglican churches. Soon after that restoration,
Bruton Parish transferred the cross to the College for use in that chapel. To complete
the relevant chronology, the Supreme Court-a decade after that transfer-ruled that
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment and, therefore, applied to the states.
24
I1. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INJURY
In a message explaining the decision to remove the Wren Chapel cross, President
Nichol wrote that permanent display of the cross treated non-Christian students as
outsiders in the College community.' 25 Such treatment, he argued, was inconsistent
with the school's commitment to diversity and its identity as a public institution. 26
Opponents criticized the decision as political correctness run amok. 127 The College
had no obligation, they argued, to protect the sensibilities of those who might be
offended by seeing a cross displayed in a chapel, especially because no one was re-
quired to attend events in the chapel, and the cross could be removed on request for
specific events.
128
120 Godson, supra note 2.
121 id.
122 Sanford Charles Gladden, John Millington (1779-1868), 13 WM. & MARY C. Q. HIST.
MAG. 155, 157 (1933); Godson, supra note 2.
123 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
124 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
125 Nichol, Statement to the Board of Visitors, supra note 1.
126 See id.
127 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
128 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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The dispute between supporters and opponents of Nichol's decision masks a
deeper conceptual agreement between the parties about the purpose of the prohibition
on government establishment of religion. Both sides focus on individual injury as the
harm against which the prohibition is directed, although the sides have very different
ideas about what injuries are cognizable.
The focus on harm or injury to individuals is understandable but is underinclusive
to the point of being misleading as a normative account of the Establishment Clause.
The concern about personal injuries is primarily an artifact of Article 111,129 which
requires the presence of a live "case" or "controversy" as a predicate of adjudication
in the federal courts. 1" ° Under the Court's long-standing jurisprudence of Article 111,
a plaintiff must have suffered a personal injury, caused by a violation of the law and
redressable by judicial remedy, in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. 3 ' The Supreme Court's most recent encounter with the Clause was in Hein v.
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. 32 In Hein, the Court rejected the asserted
standing of federal taxpayers to complain of discretionary executive expenditures in
support of the President's Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. 133 Hein has served
to reinforce this injury-driven view of the Establishment Clause.'34
By focusing on the Establishment Clause as a protection for individuals, however,
participants in the Wren Chapel cross controversy overlooked a fundamental aspect
of the Clause-its character as a jurisdictional limitation on the authority of govern-
ment over religion, 35 a limitation that exists whether anyone is personally injured
within the meaning of Article III by a particular transgression. The parties are hardly
alone in this oversight, but a better appreciation of the Establishment Clause as ajuris-
dictional limitation on government would bring much-needed clarity.
President Nichol's defense of his decision to remove the Wren Chapel cross
consistently, although implicitly, invoked an understanding of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence first articulated by Justice O'Connor who, by coincidence, serves as
Chancellor of William and Mary.136 In a message to the Board of Visitors, Nichol said:
129 U.S. CONST. art. III.
130 Id. art. I, § 2.
131 See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2562 (2007)
(citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
132 127 S. Ct. 2553.
133 Id.
'34 Id. at 2559.
13" We first suggested this jurisdictional conception of the Clause in Ira C. Lupu & Robert
Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L.
REv. 37, 84 (2002). We say more about this conception in Part IV, below, as we discuss gov-
ernmental acknowledgment of religion. For a related conception of the Establishment Clause
as a structural, rather than individual-oriented, limitation on government, see Carl H. Esbeck,
The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L.
REv. 1 (1998).
136 President Nichol played a large role in appointing Justice O'Connor to Chancellor of
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[T]he display of a Christian cross-the most potent symbol of
my own religion-in the heart of our most important building
sends an unmistakable message that the Chapel belongs more
fully to some of us than to others. That there are, at the College,
insiders and outsiders. Those for whom our most revered place
is meant to be keenly welcoming, and those for whom presence
is only tolerated. That distinction, I believe, to be contrary to the
best values of the College.'37
This description of the injury caused by display of the cross closely tracks
O'Connor's definition of government messages that represent unconstitutional en-
dorsements of religion. Concurring in Lynch v. Donnelly, O'Connor wrote: "Endorse-
ment sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends the oppo-
site message."' 38 The government engages in impermissible endorsement, Justice
O'Connor explained, if it intends to communicate a message of religious inclusion or
exclusion, or if a reasonable observer would understand the message as one of reli-
gious inclusion or exclusion, whether or not the government intended that meaning. 1
39
Justice O'Connor's endorsement-based theory can be understood in a number
of ways, but one recent and prominent elaboration of the approach suggests that it pro-
tects individuals against the experience of official disparagement based on religion. 1
40
the College. See A New Star for William and Mary, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk), Oct. 10,
2005, at B8.
137 Nichol, Statement to the Board of Visitors, supra note 1; see also Petkofsky, supra
note 1. President Nichol elaborated on this theme using the same language of "insiders" and
"outsiders" in his December 20,2006, email to students and faculty of the College. Email from
Gene Nichol, President, College of William & Mary, to Students of William & Mary (Dec. 20,
2006, 13:38:16 EST), available at http://www.wm.edu/news/?id=7102. It is no surprise that
Nichol, a federal courts scholar who wrote extensively on the question of standing to sue in
the federal courts, would frame his defense in the language of injury to individual students.
See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CAL. L. REV.
1915 (1986); GeneR. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DuKE
L.J. 1141 (1993); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REv. 68 (1984).
138 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'3 Id. at 690; see also McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 883-84 (2005)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 624-32 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
'40 CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 124-28 (2007). For a review of the Eisgruber and Sager book, see Ira C. Lupu
& Robert W. Tuttle, The Limits of Equal Liberty as a Theory of Religious Freedom, 85 TEX.
L. Rv. 1247 (2007); see also id. at 1252-59 (commenting on Eisgruber and Sager's anti-
disparagement principle).
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According to this view, the importance of religious belief for individual identity makes
people especially vulnerable to such disparagement. 4 ' A message of religious dispar-
agement is thus similar to one of racial disparagement; both imply the subordination
and exclusion of the demeaned individual or group.
42
Those who opposed the decision to remove the cross disputed Nichol's claim that
its permanent display caused cognizable injury to non-Christians. 43 If offense to some-
one's personal religious sensibilities is the measure of a particular symbol's unlaw-
fulness, critics argued, any public religious display, however innocuous, is subject
to challenge and removal.'" A number of critics asked why the altar, or even the Wren
Chapel itself, should not also be removed, as either might generate offense to the non-
religious.145 The endorsement test, wrote Newt Gingrich and Christopher Levenick,
"leads to the rule of the perpetually aggrieved, a tyranny of the easily offended."' 46
Nichol' s opponents claimed that, instead of highlighting a hypothetical person's
experience of offense, scrutiny of religious displays should focus on the actual expe-
rience of compulsion or exclusion. 47 No one had complained of being barred from
using the chapel or required to attend a function at which the cross was present.
148
Under this theory of harm, the absence of proof of such coercion--or even the realistic
threat that coercion might be exercised in the future-meant that Nichol lacked a
good reason for ordering removal of the cross.
Like Nichol, those who opposed removal of the cross invoked a theory of the
Establishment Clause that has a respectable pedigree. Dissenting in part in County
ofAllegheny v. ACLU, Justice Kennedy argued that personal compulsion is a neces-
sary element of government establishment of religion.149 Such coercion may take a
variety of forms, including compelled religious observance, state sponsorship of reli-
gious observances in public schools, taxation for the support of religious ministries,
or "governmental exhortation to religiosity that amounts in fact to proselytizing."'
' 50
'"' EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 140, at 124-28.
142 Id. at 127-28.
4 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
'4 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
145 Newt Gingrich & Christopher Levenick, Laus Deo: Crossing the Line at William and
Mary, NAT. REv. ONLINE, Jan. 31, 2007, available at http://article.nationalreview.coml/?q=
OWNkZWJ1YThIZGMzMzRhZTQwNDYwMGQ 1ZGQyODJmNDg.
146 id.
"47 See id.; Haley, supra note 2.
148 See Haley, supra note 2. But see Meredith Henne, William & Mary's Chapel at a
Crossroad, FIRSTTHINGS, Feb. 28,2007, available athttp://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/
?p=647 (noting that one heavily redacted letter reported unease, and Nichol said he received
numerous verbal comments "echoing this sentiment").
"49 492 U.S. 573, 659-62 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
For a scholar's presentation of this coercion-based view of the Establishment Clause, see
Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 933 (1986).
'o County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659-60. Justice Kennedy expanded further on his
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If coercion is not present, however, government displays of religion pose a signifi-
cantly diminished risk of harm to Establishment Clause values: 'This is most evident
where the government's act of recognition or accommodation is passive and symbolic,
for in that instance any intangible benefit to religion is unlikely to present a realistic
risk of establishment."' 5'1 Under this theory, permanent display of the Wren Chapel
cross would cause no material harm because the display is merely "passive or
symbolic" rather than coercive. 52
A still narrower theory of the relevant constitutional injury focuses on the concept
of legal coercion, which has been at the center of the view of the Establishment Clause
advanced by Justices Scalia and Thomas. Dissenting in Lee v. Weisman, 5 which held
government sponsored prayers at middle school commencement to be unconstitu-
tional, Justice Scalia insisted that coercion backed by legal penalty was a necessary
element of a violation of the Clause. 54 Because Ms. Weisman and the other students
were under no such coercive threat-no legal consequence would befall them if they
refused to attend graduation or refused to stand during recitation of the prayer-Justice
Scalia concluded that the government's role in sponsoring the recitation of the prayer
did not run afoul of the Establishment Clause. 5
5
The deeper, jurisprudential debate over the meaning of injury under the Establish-
ment Clause has taken on a special importance in the wake of the Supreme Court's
decision in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation.'56 Hein involved an Establish-
ment Clause challenge to conferences promoting the Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives (FBCI), held by the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives and several executive branch agencies.' The plaintiffs alleged that the
conferences violated the Establishment Clause by endorsing and promoting religion.15 8
The government moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to bring the lawsuit.'59 Citing Flast v. Cohen,'" the plaintiffs asserted that
they were injured as taxpayers because the conferences were funded with revenues
generated by taxation. 16' Although taxpayers as such normally do not have standing
to challenge the constitutionality of government expenditures, 62 Flast created an
theory of coercion as an element of Establishment Clause violations in his opinion for the
Court in Lee v. Weisman. 505 U.S. 577, 590-94 (1992).
'' County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 662.
152 See id.
1 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
'54 Id. at 640-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas joined in this opinion. Id.
"' Id. at 631-46.
156 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007). For our analysis of Hein, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 23.
'17 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2559.
" Id. at 2560-61.
159 Id. at 2561.
16o 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
161 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2565.
162 Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) (holding that state and local
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exception for suits brought under the Establishment Clause. 163 The government
argued that the court should limit the application of Flast to expenditures that have
been specifically authorized by Congress, and the FBCI conferences lacked such
authorization. 16" Instead, they were financed out of general appropriations to the
White House and agencies.' 65
The district court agreed with the government and dismissed the complaint for
lack of standing.66 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, ruling that the plaintiffs
did have standing under Flast.167 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and a sharply
divided Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, reinstating the district court's dismissal
of the complaint for lack of standing. 6 1
No opinion commanded a majority of the Court in Hein. Although the various
opinions of the Justices principally focus on the meaning and continued viability of
Flast, the deeper disagreement among the contending positions arises from rival
concepts of injury under the Establishment Clause. Justice Alito and the two other
Justices who joined his plurality opinion, announcing the Court's judgment, declined
to overrule Flast, although their opinion hardly provided a ringing endorsement of
taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases. 169 The plurality said that resolution
of the dispute in Hein did not require the Court to reconsider Flast, because the earlier
case considered only the injury to taxpayers from specific legislative appropriations
for religion, and the plaintiffs in Hein were not injured by congressional action. 70
taxpayers lack standing to complain in federal courts of alleged illegality of state franchise
tax credit); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (holding that federal taxpayers lack
standing to complain of allegedly unconstitutional federal expenditures).
163 Flast, 392 U.S. at 106.
1" Brief of Petitioners at **27-38, Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S.
Ct. 2553 (2007) (No. 06-157), 2007 WL 62299.
165 Id. at **24-27.
"6 The Memorandum and Order of Dismissal, dated November 15, 2004, is unreported
but is mentioned in a subsequent installment of the litigation, Freedom from Religion Found.,
Inc. v. Towey, No. 04-C-381-S, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39444, at *'1-2 (W.D. Wis., Jan. 11,
2005). We discuss the dismissal order in a Legal Update on the website of the Roundtable on
Religion and Social Welfare Policy. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Freedom of Religion, Inc.
(and others) v. Jim Towey, Director of White House Office of Faith Based and Community
Initiatives (and others), LEGALUPDATE (Nov. 22,2004), http://www.religionandsocialpolicy
.org/legal/legaLupdatedisplay.cfm?id=3 1.
167 Freedom from Religion Found. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006).
168 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2572.
169 Id. at 2559-72 (joining Justice Alito, were Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Kennedy).
Alito's opinion for the plurality expressed doubt about the correctness of Flast but refused
to overrule it. Id. at 2571-72. Kennedy's separate concurrence signaled his commitment to
taxpayer standing under Flast. Id. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy, however,
agreed, with the plurality opinion that Flast does not apply when the executive branch exer-
cises discretion to aid religion. Id.
170 Id. at 2571-72 (plurality opinion).
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Flast, the plurality concluded, did not compel recognition of taxpayer injury from
discretionary expenditures by executive branch agencies. 7 ' Of the five Justices in
the majority, only two, Scalia and Thomas, thought Flast should be overruled on
the ground that a taxpayer does not suffer a distinct individual injury when public
funds are used for religious purposes, regardless of which branch has authorized the
expenditures. 1
72
The four Justices in dissent rejected the distinction drawn by the plurality and
argued that taxpayers suffered the same injury from specific congressional appro-
priations as from discretionary expenditures by the executive.'73 Flast, the dissent
asserted, recognized the unique character of injury inflicted upon the consciences
of taxpayers who are compelled to provide funds used by the government to support
religion. 174 That injury is the same whether it is imposed by legislators or executive
branch officials, so taxpayers should have standing to sue without regard to the branch
of government primarily responsible for the challenged expenditure. 1
75
Hein addressed injury to taxpayers, but the Court's restrictive interpretation of the
relationship between Article II and the Establishment Clause suggests similar limi-
tations might apply to other types of Establishment Clause injury, particularly the
harm asserted by those who observe government religious displays. One month after
the Court decided Hein, the Fifth Circuit, acting en banc, ruled that a plaintiff had
failed to offer sufficient proof of his standing to challenge the constitutionality of
officially-sponsored prayers at school board meetings.'76 In Doe v. Tangipahoa
Parish School Board, the full Fifth Circuit vacated a decision of a panel of the court,'77
which had recognized the plaintiffs standing to sue based on his allegation that he
had attended the meetings and had been offended by prayers offered at them. The
school board had not challenged the plaintiffs standing, and the district court had not
addressed the issue, but the appellate court panel determined that the board had im-
pliedly admitted the plaintiff s attendance and injury.17' By a vote of eight-to-seven,
however, the full Fifth Circuit held that an implied admission by the defendant is insuf-
ficient to establish standing; the court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss. '79
Concurring in the en banc ruling, Judge DeMoss would have gone even further
and rejected observer standing regardless of the proof offered by the plaintiff that he
7' Id. at 2566.
172 Id. at 2573-84 (Scalia, J., concurring).
'73 Id. at 2584-88 (Souter, J., dissenting). Souter was joined in dissent by Justices Breyer,
Ginsberg, and Stevens. Id.
114 Id. at 2585-86.
175 Id. at 2584-86.
176 Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
... Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 2006), reh'g granted, 478
F.3d 679 (5th Cir. 2007), vacated in part, 494 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2007).
171 Id. at 194-96.
179 Doe, 494 F.3d at 499.
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had attended meetings and been offended by board-sponsored sectarian prayers."'
Citing Hein, DeMoss argued that mere exposure to a government-sponsored religious
message inflicts no more particularized injury on the observer than does compulsion
of a taxpayer for support of religion.'' Because the plaintiff voluntarily attended
the school board meetings, DeMoss reasoned, plaintiff has "established only a
general grievance indistinguishable from the one that any other non-attendee citizen
could have."' 82
However explicable the focus on individual injury may be for purposes of satis-
fying the requirements of Article 1, such a focus unfortunately diverts attention away
from debate about the substantive meaning and scope of the Establishment Clause.
Those who advocate a narrower concept of injury under the Establishment Clause
typically do so in order to advance a narrower reading of the Clause itself; likewise,
those who propose a broader understanding of injury do so to promote a broader reach
of the Clause. When the debate focuses on individual injury, however, the disputants
can do little more than assert that religious conscience is or is not peculiarly vulnerable
to harm by government promotion or support of religion. One side argues that people
should be protected from exposure to religiously offensive acts or messages of the
government, while the other argues that people should only be protected against
governmental coercion in religious matters.
Neither argument, however, directly engages the normative content of the
Establishment Clause, independent of Article I concerns. Proponents of more robust
protection for religious conscience need to explain how that quality of mind differs
from non-religious conscience and why the government is specially limited in conduct
that may affect religious sensibilities.8 3 Those who believe coercion is a necessary
element of an Establishment Clause violation need to explain why their position does
not render the Clause redundant, because virtually all governmental acts of religious
coercion would also violate the free exercise rights of those coerced.184
Both sides have plausible responses to these questions, and these responses open
the possibility of more fruitful debate about the meaning and application of the Clause.
Some have based their arguments about the distinctive quality of religious experience
180 Id. at 499-501 (DeMoss, J., concurring).
181 Id. at 500.
182 Id.
"83 See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 555 (1998) (challenging
the distinction between religiously-based and morally-based arguments for exemptions from
general laws); Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REv. 571; William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter with Equality? An Assessment of
the Equal Treatment ofReligion and Non-Religion in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND.
L.J. 193 (2000).
"s See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 621 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring). Justices Stevens
and O'Connor joined Justice Souter's concurrence. Id. at 609.
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on the heightened risk of conflict over religious differences,' others on the danger
of religious discrimination posed when government becomes involved in religious
matters, 86 others on the transcendent character of religious obligations,'87 and still
others on a more general concern with nurturing an environment in which religion
can flourish.'
In our own work, we have discussed and critiqued these views and offered our
own approach to the central question. We have argued that Establishment Clause
jurisprudence should proceed from an understanding of the state as an institution with
limited jurisdiction.8 9 That limitation arises from the idea of liberal government as
secular or temporal--concerned exclusively with matters of this age and not with care
for the spiritual welfare of its citizens.190
This theory of the limitation has much in common with the idea of the constitu-
tional right of privacy. 9' The zone of privacy and the zone of spirituality both mark
out a domain from which state supervision is excluded. Under this jurisdictional ap-
proach, the government violates the Establishment Clause when it asserts competence
to proclaim the value of religious messages, to resolve disputed religious questions,
or to subsidize religious activities.
Nevertheless, the jurisdictional limitation does not map neatly on to the Jefferso-
nian "wall of separation between church and State."' 92 Civil government and religious
institutions share many areas of mutual temporal concern, including education and
social welfare, and may cooperate in addressing those concerns without unduly in-
volving the state in religious activity. This jurisdictional approach to Establishment
Clause theory also recognizes circumstances under which government may finance
religious organizations or communicate messages that have religious content.
The Wren Chapel cross controversy provides an especially illuminating context
for exploring such circumstances. The dispute over personal injury to those offended
has tended to obscure deeper questions about the extent to which the government may
accommodate the religious practices of college students or acknowledge the religious
8' Justice Breyer has been a leader in the campaign to make "divisiveness" a touchstone
of Establishment Clause adjudication. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,703-05 (2005)
(Breyer, J., concurring); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717-29 (2002) (Breyer,
J., dissenting). For a critique of the anti-divisiveness view, see Richard W. Garnett, Religion,
Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1666 (2006).
86 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 140, at 51-67.
187 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 1.
188 See, e.g., David Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith-Based Organizations: A
Problem Best Avoided, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1365-74 (2003).
189 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our
Constitutional Order, 47 VIL. L. REV. 37, 83-92 (2002).
190 Id.
'' See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965).
192 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 164 (1879)); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
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history of the College and religious beliefs of those in the College community. It is
those questions-raised at William and Mary entirely outside the constraining con-
text of Article III, requirements of personal injury, and the specialized rules of federal
court adjudication-that President Nichol and his critics have been implicitly address-
ing in the controversy over the Wren Chapel cross.
We believe that the conversation about the Wren Chapel cross can be enriched
considerably by turning away from this narrow focus on injury and by widening the
discourse to include more comprehensive theories of the Establishment Clause. In
the remainder of this Article, we explore some of those theories and their implications
for the controversy at the College of William and Mary.
I1. ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGION IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION
Some who objected to removal of the Wren Chapel cross argued that the decision
injured the religious welfare of Christian students by stripping the chapel of its spiritual
identity.' 93 This argument rests on the unstated premise that the College is justified in
setting apart space-in a publicly-owned facility-for religious activity. Identifying
the source of that justification, at least in constitutional terms, is something of a chal-
lenge. Other state-sponsored chapels and chaplaincy programs offer the most useful
analogies. The military, prisons, and government healthcare facilities have long sup-
ported chaplaincies, and those contexts have given rise to some relevant Establishment
Clause law.' 94 But the presence of chapels and chaplaincies in higher education has
received surprisingly scant legal attention. 95
193 See Leach v. Nichol, No. 4:07cv12, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38763, at **8-9 (E.D. Va.
May 29, 2007), affid, No. 07-1630, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 27857 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 2007);
Staver, supra note 9. Both Leach and Staver claimed that removal of the cross injures the
religious liberty of Christians; the same claim has been raised in connection with the removal
of a cross from permanent display in a Veterans Affairs hospital chapel in North Carolina.
Laura Arenschield, Lawyer Takes on VA Chapel Neutrality, FAYETrEvnJE OBSERVER (N.C.),
Nov. 29, 2007.
194 See, e.g., Carter v. Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 857 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
Establishment Clause challenge to hospital chaplaincy program), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1096
(1989); Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting Establishment Clause chal-
lenge to Army chaplaincy program); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Nicholson, 469
F. Supp. 2d 609 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (dismissing Establishment Clause challenge to chaplaincy
program in Department of Veterans Affairs healthcare system); Malyon v. Pierce County,
935 P.2d 1272 (Wash. 1997) (holding that chaplaincy program of sheriffs department did
not violate federal or state prohibitions on aid to religion); see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W.
Tuttle, Instruments of Accommodation: The Military Chaplaincy and the Constitution, 110
W. VA. L. REv. 89 (2007) (offering a general framework for analysis of government-sponsored
chaplaincies).
'9' We are indebted to a paper on this subject written by Andrea Goplerud. See God on
Campus: The Constitutionality of Religious Programming on State University Campuses
(Apr. 20, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the William and Mary Bill of Rights
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At the time William and Mary became a state institution in 1907, most public
universities had chapels, and many required students to attend daily services.' 96 The
content of chapel services reflected the non-denominational Protestant "establish-
ment" that had prevailed at most universities since the mid-nineteenth century.
197
For a variety of reasons-most unrelated to the law-mandatory chapel attendance
policies were in steep decline by the 1920s and seem to have disappeared by the early
1940s.19 8 Voluntary chapel programs continued, however, some led by chaplains
employed by the universities and others by volunteers or campus ministers paid by
religious organizations. 99
In the years following the Second World War, developments in Establishment
Clause law had a significant impact on the policies of public universities toward reli-
gion. In 1947, the Supreme Court first applied the Clause to the states in Everson v.
Board of Education 200 but the most important developments followed in 1962 and
1963 when the Court struck down officially sponsored prayer and Bible reading in
Journal and the authors); see also PAUL G. KAUPER, LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION, in RELIGION
AND THE STATE UNIVERSITY 69-86 (Erich A. Walter ed., 1958). The issue arose in 2007 when
Iowa State University football coach Gene Chizik announced plans to hire a chaplain for the
school's football team. Religion Clause Blog, http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2007/05/
iowa-state-coach-wants-football-team.html (May 25, 2007). The university's Athletics Council
advised against creation of a chaplaincy and recommended creation of a "Life Skills Assistant"
who would not be exclusively focused on provision of religious counseling or support. Memo-
randum from Tim Day, Athletics Council Chair, Iowa State University, to Gregory L. Geoffrey,
President, Iowa State University (June 26,2007), available at http://www.public.iastate.edu/
-nscentral/news/2007/jun/athcouncil.shtml.
196 THE COLLEGE YEAR-BOOK AND ATHLETIC RECORD FOR THE ACADEMIC YEAR 1896-97
(Edwin Emerson, Jr. ed., New York, Stone & Kimball 1896) [hereinafter COLLEGE YEAR-
BOOK] (containing an alphabetical listing of all institutions of higher education, with descrip-
tion of chapel attendance policies for most institutions); see SEYMOUR A. SMITH, RELIGIOus
COOPERATION IN STATEUNIVERSITIES: AN HISTORICAL SKETCH 3 (1957); id. at 423. William
and Mary had a mandatory chapel attendance policy. Id. at 422. In 1891, the Illinois Supreme
Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a mandatory chapel attendance policy at the
University of Illinois. North v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 137 Ill. 296 (1891); see KAUPER,
supra note 195, at 81-82.
197 See, e.g., D.G. HART, THE UNIVERSITY GETS RELIGION: RELIGIOUS STuDIES IN
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 30-45 (1999) (discussing Protestant establishment in late-
nineteenth century universities); MARSDEN, supra note 37, at 152 (discussing content of chapel
services at Johns Hopkins University).
198 See KAUPER, supra note 195, at 78; MARSDEN, supra note 37, at 344-45. For a dis-
cussion of on campus religious activities during this period, see generally SMITH, supra note
196, at 18-72.
'99 See GEORGE W. JONES, THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY AND RELIGIOUS PRACTICE: AN INQUIRY
INTO UNIVERSITY PROVISION FOR CAMPUS RELIGIOUS LIFE (1973) (providing survey of
school-sponsored religious activities at public universities, as of 1972); SMITH, supra note
196, at 74-104.
200 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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public schools.201 Although those decisions involved primary and secondary education,
public university administrators understood that the decisions had significance for
their institutions.2 2 This was principally true with respect to the place of religion in
the curriculum and involved debates about the composition of religious studies depart-
ments and the content of courses taught by such departments. 20 3 The Court's man-
dated "separation of church and state" spelled the end of the last vestiges of religious
establishment in public universities. Religion faculties composed of Protestant semi-
nary graduates-teaching liberal Protestant interpretation of scripture, history, and
doctrine-gradually gave way in public institutions to a more pluralistic and detached
study of world religions.2°4
During the 1960s and 1970s, the separationist impulse also seems to have brought
about, or at least coincided with, a change in public university attitudes toward religion
on campus. 20 5 In addition to the termination of most paid state university chaplain-
cies2 - victims of budgetary and constitutional concerns-this period also witnessed
the adoption of a surprisingly over-compliant response to the constitutional princi-
ples of separationism. Some state university administrators believed that the Court's
Establishment Clause rulings required the schools to ban student religious groups
from all use of public facilities, even if the facilities were available for use by non-
religious student groups. 2 7 The provision of campus facilities for use by religious
groups, these administrators asserted, represented an impermissible public subsidy
of religion.20 8
In Widmar v. Vincent, a religious student group at the University of Missouri at
Kansas City (UMKC) challenged such a policy, claiming that the exclusion of the
group from campus facilities violated the students' rights under the Free Exercise
201 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (rejecting Bible reading);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (rejecting officially sponsored prayer).
202 HART, supra note 197, at 203-08; Leslie Griffin, "We Do Not Preach. We Teach."
Religion Professors and the First Amendment, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 1, 6-10,20-28 (2000).
203 HART, supra note 197, at 208-22; JONES, supra note 199, at 31.
204 HART, supra note 197, at 223-34.
2105 Jones provides the best description of this shift. See JONES, supra note 199, at 6-33.
206 Id. at 8, 10, 35; Robert L. Johnson, Ministry in Secular Colleges and Universities, in
THE CHURCH'S MINISTRY IN HIGHER EDUCATION 216, 219 (John H. Westerhoff ed., 1978);
Goplerud, supra note 195, at 12.
207 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 & n.3 (1981) (discussing university
regulations that barred use of campus facilities "for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching by either student or nonstudent groups").
208 Id.; see also Brief for Center for Constitutional Studies et al. as Amici Curia Supporting
Respondents, Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (No. 80-689), 1981 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 891, at *19-26 (describing a survey of campus ministers at public institutions of higher
education, concerning exclusion of religious ministries from campus facilities). Jones noted
this trend in his 1972 study of religious activity at public universities. JONEs, supra note 199,
at 15, 34-36.
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and Free Speech Clauses.2 9 UMKC argued that the policy was required by the
Establishment Clause, but the Supreme Court disagreed. 2"0 By an eight-to-one vote,
the Court held that UMKC's policy was unconstitutional, because the prohibition on
religious use, including worship, amounted to content-based regulation of speech. 2,,
In making university facilities available for general use by student groups, the Court
reasoned, UMKC created a public forum for student groups and thus could not dis-
criminate in granting access to the forum based on the content of groups' speech.2 12
Religious student groups were entitled to use the facilities on an equal basis with non-
religious student groups.213
The Court rejected UMKC' s Establishment Clause defense, holding that the grant
of equal access to a religious group does not make the university responsible for the
religious content of the group's message.214 Because UMKC permitted any student
group to use the facilities and there was no reason to believe that only religious groups
would take advantage of that opportunity, the Court said that the university's policy
did not represent improper aid to religion.2 5 Instead, equal access to campus facilities
more closely resembled other benefits, such as police or fire protection, generally
distributed to all persons and groups in a community.2 6
Just over a decade later, the Court extended the principles of Widmar to another
case involving religious activities at state universities. In Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of University of Virginia, a religious student group sued when the University
of Virginia (UVA) rejected the group's request for a subsidy that UVA provided to
other eligible student groups. 217 The subsidy, which was derived from mandatory
student activity fees, financed printing costs for student group publications.2 8 A
Christian student organization, Wide Awake, sought the printing subsidy for its maga-
zine, and UVA denied the request because of the organization's religious character
and the religious content of the magazine.2 9
The group sued, alleging that UVA' s denial of the printing subsidy violated its
rights under the Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Equal Protection Clauses.2 0 Wide
Awake claimed that the printing subsidy constituted a limited public forum, and by
209 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
210 Id. at 270-75.
211 Id. at 277.
212 Id. at 273-75.
213 Id.; see also Keegan v. Univ. of Del., 349 A.2d 14, 16-19 (Del. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 934 (1976) (holding that exclusion of student religious groups from use of campus
facilities violated both the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause).
214 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274.
215 Id. at 274.
216 Id. at 274-75.
217 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
218 Id. at 824-26.
219 Id. at 825-27.
220 Id. at 827.
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excluding religious groups, UVA had imposed an impermissible content-based
restriction on access to that forum.221 UVA asserted that the Establishment Clause
prohibited the university from subsidizing the printing costs of a religious publi-
cation and the Fourth Circuit agreed.222 But the Supreme Court reversed the circuit
court's decision with a five-to-four majority ruling that availability of the printing
subsidy was indistinguishable from the access to physical facilities of the school at
issue in Widmar.
22 3
Taken together, Widmar and Rosenberger define the equality-based minimum
that public universities must provide for student religious life. To the extent that re-
sources and opportunities are available for non-religious student groups and activities,
the same must be available for relevantly-similar religious student groups and activi-
ties. Thus, if student groups are generally eligible to reserve classrooms, use university
photocopiers or distribution networks, or receive reimbursement for the costs of bring-
ing speakers to campus, then the religious character of some student groups should
not disqualify them from such benefits.224 Widmar and Rosenberger thus establish
equality as the floor: student religious activity on campus must not be disfavored as
compared to relevantly-similar non-religious student activity.
The controversy over the Wren Chapel cross, however, does not have the same
constitutional character as the issues presented in Widmar and Rosenberger. President
Nichol's decision to move the cross did not involve the exclusion of religious groups
from campus or the denial of equal benefits to religious student organizations. In-
stead, the controversy implicated what may be thought of as the ceiling-the upper
constitutional limit-of public university support for student religious life. At what
point would such support constitute an impermissible establishment of religion?
The answer to that question can be found in the idea of religious accommodation,
which has been a feature of Establishment Clause jurisprudence since the Court's
221 See Reply Brief for the Petitioners, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819 (1995) (No. 94-329), 1995 WL 65465.
222 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 515
U.S. 819 (1995). Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether
the Establishment Clause required the exclusion of religious groups from the printing subsidy,
UVA did not aggressively advance thatjustification before the Court and instead focused its
argument on the need for governmental discretion in spending and the collateral implications of
a ruling in favor of Wide Awake. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 832-38. UVA lost in Rosenberger,
but the Court's subsequent decision in Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004), suggested that
the Court was mindful of the concerns raised by the university in Rosenberger. In Davey, the
Court held that the exclusion of the pursuit of a theology degree from an otherwise-inclusive
state scholarship program did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id.
223 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819.
224 For a recent application of Widmar and Rosenberger, see Roman Catholic Foundation
v. Walsh, No. 07-cv-505-jcs, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4137 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 17,2008) (holding
that state university could not withhold student activity funds from a Roman Catholic student
group).
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decision in Zorach v. Clauson.22' Zorach involved a New York program under which
parents could arrange to have their children released from public school in order to
attend religious instruction during the school day.226 The students who did not attend
religious classes remained at school for that period.227 The plaintiffs challenged the
program as a violation of the Establishment Clause, arguing that the program imper-
missibly involved public schools-and the power of compulsory education-in the
enterprise of religious instruction.228 In an opinion written by Justice Douglas, a six-
to-three majority ruled that the program did not violate the Establishment Clause.229
Under the released-time program, the Court held, "the public schools do no more than
accommodate their schedules to a program of outside religious instruction., 23' The
public schools did not require students to attend, supervise the teachers, determine the
content of instruction, or even provide the facilities.23' The accommodation, the Court
reasoned, merely responded to the request of parents by opening time in the school
day for voluntary religious education.232
In separate dissents, Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson identified concerns
that would eventually become central to the concept of accommodation.2 33 The dis-
senters argued that normal school hours left plenty of time for religious instruction,
so parents had little need for the accommodation.3 Moreover, they highlighted the
program's impact on non-participating students, who were required to remain at
school during the period of religious instruction. 235 These features, they claimed,
225 343 U.S. 306 (1952). We provide a more detailed analysis of the doctrinal history of
the idea of accommodation in Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 194, at 101-16. For other academic
commentary on accommodation of religion, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Accommodation and
Equal Liberty, 42 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1007 (2001); Carl H. Esbeck, When Accommodations
for Religion Violate the Establishment Clause: Regularizing the Supreme Court's Analysis,
110W. VA. L. REv. 359 (2007); Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the
Accommodation ofReligion Under the Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment, 52 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 75 (1990); Kent Greenawalt, Establishment Clause Limits on Free Exercise Accom-
modations, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 343 (2007); Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of
Religious Behavior and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE
DAMEL. REv. 1793 (2006); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation ofReligion: An Update
and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEo. WASH. L.REv. 685 (1992); McConnell, supra note 187.
226 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 308.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 309-10.
229 See id. at 308, 315.
230 Id. at 315.
231 Id. at 313-15. Because the instruction occurred away from school property, the program
differed from a scheme of religious instruction in public schools that the Court had previously
held unconstitutional. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
232 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 311-13.
233 See id. at 315-20 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 320-23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id.
at 323-25 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
234 Id. at 323 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 324 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
233 Id. at 321 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2008]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
strongly suggested that the program promoted religious education-and penalized
those who declined to participate-rather than relieving any discernible burden on
religious exercise.
23 6
The seeds of the accommodation doctrine planted in the Zorach dissents germi-
nated in a series of cases decided during the mid-1980s: Wallace v. Jaffree,237 Estate
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,2 8 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,2 39 and
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock.24° Wallace involved a challenge to an Alabama statute
that provided for a moment of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer" at the be-
ginning of the public school day.241 In Caldor, employers challenged a Connecticut
statute that required them to accommodate employees' requests for Sabbath obser-
vance. 242 In Amos, the Court considered an amendment to a federal civil rights law
that exempted religious organizations from prohibitions on religion-based employment
discrimination.243 Texas Monthly involved a challenge to the exemption of religious
publications from a state sales tax imposed on other publications.
244
Although the cases arose in quite varied factual contexts, a single thread runs
through the decisions. In all of them, the plaintiffs alleged that the government had
violated the Establishment Clause, and the government defended by arguing that the
challenged practice was a permissible accommodation of religion. The Court's hold-
ings in these cases, amplified in two additional decisions over the last twenty years,
245
generate four consistent criteria for determining whether an accommodation violates
the Establishment Clause.240 First, the accommodation must relieve a government-
imposed burden on religious exercise.247 Second, no one may be compelled to partici-
pate in the accommodated religious activity, and the content of that activity must be
determined by private actors, not by government agents. 248 Third, the accommodation
236 Id. at 318 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's concurrence in Schempp expanded
on the ideas advanced in the Zorach dissenting opinions. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-304 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). In Schempp, supporters
of mandatory Bible reading in public schools had argued that the practice accommodated the
religious preferences of many parents, but Brennan argued that the practice could not be justi-
fied as an accommodation. See id. Public schooling did not impede students' access to religious
experience; moreover, the alleged accommodation was imposed on all students, not just to
those who specifically requested the experience. Id. at 298-99.
237 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
238 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
239 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
240 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
241 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40 & n.2 (citing ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984)).
242 Caldor, 472 U.S. at 704-05, 707-08.
243 Amos, 483 U.S. at 335-38.
244 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5.
245 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
246 We elaborate on these cases and criteria in Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 194, at 101-16.
247 See infra Part III.A.
248 See infra Part III.B.
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must be available on an equal basis to all faiths.24 9 And fourth, the accommodation
must not impose significant hardships on third parties. 250 We provide a brief description
of each criterion and then suggest how it should be applied to both the Wren Chapel
and its cross.
A. Response to Burden on Religion
The first criterion provides the distinguishing characteristic of a religious accom-
modation: the state acts to relieve a burden on religion caused by official policies or
practices. But if no such burden exists, then the accommodation is unwarranted."'
In both Texas Monthly and Wallace, the Court used this criterion to strike down the
purported accommodation. The Court held that the sales tax at issue in Texas Monthly
did not impose a burden peculiar to religion because religious publications subjected
to the tax would have been burdened in exactly the same manner as non-religious
publications.252 Thus, the Court held, exemption of religious publications conferred
on these publications an impermissible benefit. 253 In Wallace, the Court found that
public school students were not materially burdened in their opportunity to exercise
silent prayer, because a previous moment-of-silence statute that did not specifically
mention prayer had already set aside the time for meditation at the beginning of
school.254
In contrast, the Court upheld the accommodation in Amos because it found that
religious employers were especially burdened by the statutory prohibition on religious
discrimination, even though the prior version of the Civil Rights Act exempted some
positions from coverage.255 Religious organizations, the Court declared, had a unique
interest in preferring employees of their own faith, and the previous exemption allowed
the organizations to exercise that preference only with respect to positions that in-
volved religious duties.2 56 Although the Court expressed the view that the original,
narrower exemption may have been sufficient to avoid a violation of such employers'
Free Exercise rights, the Establishment Clause did not forbid the government from
extending broader protection than the Constitution's minimum requirement5 7 Indeed,
the Court found application of the earlier exemption had chilled religious organizations'
exercise of the protection, because the exemption had required the organizations to
anticipate which positions would be treated as sufficiently religious to be exempted
249 See infra Part III.C.
250 See infra Part III.D.
251 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 627-29 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
252 Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1989).
253 Id. at 25.
254 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 58-60 (1985).
255 Corp. of Presiding Bishops v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335-37 (1987).
256 Id. at 335-36.
257 Id. at 336-37.
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from anti-discrimination law and had led to litigation over the exemption's bound-
aries. 58 The broader exemption, the Court concluded, was appropriately responsive
to this burden on religious exercise. 9
At first glance, the Wren Chapel and cross appear to be significantly different from
the accommodations challenged in Wallace, Caldor, Amos, and Texas Monthly. Amos
and Texas Monthly addressed negative accommodations-that is, the government
merely declined to extend a particular regulation to the protected religious practice.26
Even Wallace and Caldor would have required only limited government interaction
with the accommodation.26' The moment-of-silence provision at issue in Wallace
needed only the teacher to announce the meditation period, while the protection for
Sabbath observance in Caldor depended on private employers' compliance with the
statutory mandate, enforced only upon complaint by particular employees.2 62 The
Wren Chapel and its cross, however, involve affirmative acts in support of religion
and thus have more in common with the religious accommodations found in the
military, in prisons, and in government healthcare facilities. In such settings, the
government finances religious ministries-including clergy salaries, places of
worship, religious instruction, and pastoral care-for the sake of those under the
care or control of the institution.263
Nevertheless, these affirmative accommodations can be measured against the
same standard as regulatory exemptions-is the government's assistance to religion
responsive to a government-imposed burden? Prison chaplaincy programs easily meet
that test because incarceration isolates prisoners from their religious communities,
and the government's control over the movement, assembly, visitation, and activity
of prisoners can severely limit prisoners' opportunities to practice their faith.264 Those
who serve in the military suffer similar burdens on their exercise of religion, in addition
to the other personal and familial stresses that are unique to the demands of military
life. 265 Thus, the military chaplaincy also meets the standard of responsiveness to
a government-imposed burden. Hospital in-patients may be similarly deprived of
258 Id. at 336.
'59 Id. at 336-38.
26 Id. at 329 (concerning an exemption from Tile VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-1); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (concerning an exemption
from Texas state sales tax, TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.312 (Vernon 1982)).
26 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703,706-08 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 40 (1985).
262 Caldor, 472 U.S. at 706-08; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40.
263 See, e.g., Carter v. Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 857 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1988); Katcoff v.
Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985).
264 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 297-98 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (reasoning that prison and military chaplains are permissible ac-
commodations of religion); Montano v. Hedgepeth, 120 F.3d 844, 850 n. 10 (8th Cir. 1997);
Theriault v. Silber, 547 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 871 (1977).
265 See, e.g., Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 234-35; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 194, at 118-20.
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ordinary access to religious experience at a time when patients may be especially in
need of religious counseling or comfort.266
Public higher education lacks most of the characteristics that justify accommo-
dations in the military, prisons, and healthcare facilities. College students are not
physically confined by the government, typically have access to faith communities
outside the college, and are free to gather on or off campus for religious purposes. The
college imposes no direct obstacle to students' exercise of religion.267 This suggests,
at minimum, that public universities will be more limited than the military, prisons, or
hospitals in their legal authority to provide affirmative religious services for students.
For example, public universities would find it difficult to justify the employment of
full-time chaplains.268 Unlike the military and prisons, colleges do not have the con-
cerns about security that justify restriction of access to service members and inmates
and thus do not have the same need for a cadre of screened and trained ministers
who can be trusted in especially sensitive or dangerous areas. Nor do colleges share
healthcare facilities' need to fully integrate pastoral care into the institutions'
respective services.
Even if the circumstances of college life are insufficient to warrant a full-time
chaplaincy program, student experience may present a more subtle and indirect bur-
den on the full realization of student religious choices, and this burden should justify
some degree of religious accommodation. Many universities attempt to create a com-
prehensive community for students, one that stretches beyond the basics of education,
shelter, and food.269 To enhance students' experience of college life, schools provide
266 See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found. v. Nicholson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 609 (W.D.
Wis. 2007). Our analysis of this decision is available online. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. (and others) v. R. James Nicholson, Secretary of
the Department of Veteran Affairs (and others), LEGAL UPDATE, (Jan. 16, 2007), http://www
.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legallegalupdatedisplay.cfm?id=55.
267 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 288-89 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing
that university students suffered no significant burden on religion, even by exclusion from
use of campus facilities). On campus religious life more generally, see JOHN SCHMALZBAUER,
CAMPUS MINISTRY: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT, ESSAY FORUM ON THE RELIGIOUS ENGAGE-
MENTS OF AMERICAN UNDERGRADUATES (2007), available at http://religion.ssrc.org/reforurn
Schmalzbauer.pdf.
268 The controversy over the proposed hiring of a chaplain for the Iowa State University
football team, described supra note 195, offers a useful illustration. Because the coach first
proposed the position in the context of a meeting of the Fellowship of Christian Athletes,
critics were concerned that the purpose of such a chaplaincy had more to do with promotion
of a particular religious view than a genuine attempt to facilitate student religious choices.
See ISU Faculty Opposes Chaplain, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 26,2007, at 2C; see also
Pastor Named to ISU Football "Life Skills" Position, SIOUx CITY J., July 26, 2007, available
athttp://www.siouxcityjournal.com/articles/2007/07/26/news/latestnews/fdac39adc2ela8ef
862573240044f747.txt.
269 See, e.g., Campus Life, http://www.wm.edu/campuslife/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2008)
(listing services and opportunities available to students at the College of William and Mary).
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opportunities for entertainment, arts, athletics, socializing, and even self-governance.27 °
Most universities also provide healthcare, counseling, and police protection.27" ' Con-
sidered separately, those services or activities are unremarkable; but taken together,
they present a self-sufficient community. Omission of religious interests from that
community would impose a modest obstacle to student religious experience, if only
in the requirement that students exit from the community constituted by the college
in order to participate in religious life.272
To address that obstacle, public universities should be permitted to accommodate
student religious needs by facilitating opportunities for worship or other religious
experience. Many universities do this through a campus religious life coordinator
who typically screens and registers religious groups that want to work with students,
supports such groups with administrative resources (photocopying, scheduling rooms,
etc.), and helps the groups publicize their campus activities.273 The coordinator's
position fits comfortably within the standards for religious accommodation because
it responds directly to students' interest in finding a place for religious life within the
school's comprehensive community.
Colleges can justify maintenance of a designated chapel in much the same way
that they can justify the religious coordinator's position.274 The chapel offers a physical
locus for religious life within the campus community. It provides a place for campus
religious groups to worship, equipped with commonly-used resources (such as a piano
or organ), as well as a place set apart for private meditation. And the chapel does so
in the context of a campus that is typically filled with structures that serve the widest
range of other student needs. The constitutional questions about public university
chapels thus should not focus on the existence of such facilities, but rather-as we
discuss below-on their configuration and policies for their use.
Of course, the dispute at William and Mary involved not the general availability
of a chapel, but the display of a specific religious symbol within a particular chapel.
Compared with the provision of a chapel or religious life coordinator, a permanent
display of a particular faith's religious symbol might not appear to respond to any
burden whatsoever on student religious exercise. If students in fact desire to worship
270 See, e.g., id.
271 See, e.g., id.
272 George W. Jones, Knowing the Legal and Political Opportunities, in REUGION ON
CAMPUS 38 (John Butlered., 1989); see Goplerud, supra note 195, at 16 (quoting Jones, supra).
273 Goplerud, supra note 195, at 27-28 (describing the religious activities office at the
University of Maryland). For other examples, see a description of religious activities at Kansas
State University. Religion at K-State, http://consider.k-state.edu/clubs/religion.htm (last visited
Jan. 28, 2008). See also CONST. OF THE CAMPUS MINISTRY Ass'N OF THE UNIV. OF GA. art. 6
(1997) (describing the role of university Coordinator of Religious Affairs), available at http:l
www.uga.edu/cma/shared/files/Constitution.pdf.
274 See Glenn A. Olds, Religious Centers, in RELIGION AND THE STATE UNIvERsrrY 226-47
(Erich A. Walter ed., 1958); SMrrH, supra note 196, at 96-98.
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in a faith-specific environment, provision of the necessary artifacts of that environment
may be responsive to circumstances of relative isolation and physical convenience.
Accordingly, temporary provision of religious materials and symbols such as icons
and other items used in worship may be constitutionally appropriate.275 Permanent
display of the cross or any other symbol of a specific faith, however, is quite vulner-
able on the second and third criteria, analyzed below, concerning religious equality
and government selection of religious content.
B. Voluntary Participation, Private Religious Content
The second criterion serves as a corollary of the initial requirement of government
responsiveness to private religious need. The government may fairly be said to have
accommodated religion only if participation in the resulting religious activity is vol-
untary, and the content of that activity is selected by the participants rather than the
government. Conversely, if the government mandates participation or determines the
content of the religious activity, the activity takes on the character of government pro-
motion, rather than facilitation, of religious experience.276 The concept of accom-
modation has long emphasized this distinction between promoting state religion and
facilitating private religious experience. Concurring inAbington Township v. Schempp,
Justice Brennan argued that the practice of daily prayer and Bible reading in public
schools could not be defended as an accommodation because the students did not
elect to attend the classes or choose the religious experience they would receive. 277
And in Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice O'Connor said that the challenged moment-of-
silence provision was not an accommodation because the legislation at issue attempted
to specify prayer as a government-approved way for students to use the time, as com-
pared to an earlier and still-valid statute that simply created a time for students to use
as they saw fit.278 By urging students to pray, the state moved from accommodating
to promoting religion.
Mandatory chapel attendance policies at a public university would fail under this
second criterion, as would any other required program of religious instruction or ob-
servance.2 7 9 But public universities are very unlikely to return to compulsory religious
275 For example, prayer rugs, prayer shawls, candles, candle holders, a crucifix, or a Star of
David might be brought out for faith group worship-when such materials respond to specific
religious need-but would otherwise need to be stored.
276 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 298-300 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
277 Id.
278 472 U.S. 38, 67-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
279 See, e.g., Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1019
(2004) (holding that Virginia Military Institute practice of prayer before meal, at which atten-
dance is required, violates the Establishment Clause); Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972) (holding that a compulsory chapel attendance policy
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activity, so the more relevant part of the second criterion is the requirement that the
content of accommodated religious activity must be privately chosen. In other words,
the government may provide the opportunity for religious experience, but it may not
decide how that opportunity will be used. That choice belongs to the accommoda-
tion' s beneficiaries.
The distinction between facilitating and promoting faith applies readily to the
role of a coordinator for religious life. As long as the coordinator acts as a liaison be-
tween students and religious groups, offering each the opportunity to make contact
with the other, the university is fairly deemed to be accommodating students' faith
experience. If, however, the coordinator were to steer students toward a particular
group, then the university would be asserting an interest in the content of students'
religious experience-an interest that is fundamentally incompatible with the idea of
accommodation.
Chapels offer a more difficult setting in which to frame the distinction between
accommodation and promotion of religion. Unlike a moment of silence, which can
be filled with each student's thoughts of any kind, a designated chapel will ordinarily
represent someone's substantive idea of space that is appropriate for religious experi-
ence. For example, the configuration of the Wren Chapel reflects seventeenth cen-
tury Anglican ideas about scripture and sacrament, minister and congregation.280 Of
course, universities may choose to provide separate chapels for all major faith groups,
so each group can worship in a setting that embodies its tradition. 28 ' But scarcity of
resources and other problems of administration point to the option of one, all-inclusive
chapel. If a school, like William and Mary, has only one chapel, must the architecture
be stripped of all marks that connect it to a particular religious tradition?
The restriction on government-supplied religious content does not require such
drastic measures. Instead, the relevant question is whether the chapel's configuration
limits its use to that of a particular faith, or whether the architecture and furnishings
at military academies violates the Establishment Clause); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 586-99 (1992) (holding that students are effectively compelled to attend public school
graduation ceremonies, so officially-sponsored prayer at those ceremonies violates the Estab-
lishment Clause).
280 DAVIS & RAWLINGS, supra note 119, at 12-19; DELL UPTON, HOLY THINGS AND
PROFANE: ANGLICAN PARISH CHURCHES IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 47-62 (1997); Henne, supra
note 148.
28' The military academies have multiple chapels, but very few other schools have more
than a single facility. See Savethewrencross.org, Top State Universities and National Military
Academies (survey) (copy on file with authors and William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal).
Military academies such as the Air Force Academy, West Point, and the Naval Academy all
have multiple facilities for different faiths. See United States Air Force, Cadet Chapel Fact
Sheet, http://www.usafa.af.mil/superintendent/pa/factsheets/chapel.htm (last visited Jan. 28,
2008); United States Naval Academy, Chaplain Center, http://www.usna.edu/Chaplains/
services.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2008); West Point Chapels, http://www.usma.edu/Chaplain/
chapels.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
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are capable of being used by all faiths. We recognize that, for reasons of belief, some
faith groups might not worship in facilities used at other times by other religious com-
munities. But a particular faith tradition's need to worship in a space used only by
that group does not undermine the formal openness of the chapel's worship space for
use by all faiths. The needs of that faith tradition, not the design of the chapel or re-
strictions imposed by the government, would be the cause of that group's inability to
use the chapel.
The Wren Chapel provides an especially good illustration of this point. The front
of the chapel includes an altar, pulpit, lectern, and chancel rail.282 For those versed
in church history and architecture, the arrangement and decoration of these fixtures
express a particularly Protestant era of Anglicanism.283 The wooden table-not a
traditional altar-highlights the significance of the Eucharist as a communal meal
rather than a repetition of Christ's sacrifice.284 The low chancel rail, compared to a
medieval rood screen, dramatically reduces the distance between the congregation and
minister.285 The placement of the pulpit and lectern signifies the relative importance
of scripture and preaching and reduces the emphasis on liturgy.28 6 As others have
observed, these architectural emphases carry an implicit historical and theological
message of anti-Catholicism, rejecting the Roman Catholic Church's teachings on the
priesthood, the sacraments, and the means of salvation.
287
That rich theological and architectural significance, however, does not mean that
the government has impermissibly provided the religious content of an accommo-
dation. First, as we develop in the next Part, the configuration of the Wren Chapel can
be traced to a source other than the government's desire to promote a particular faith
tradition. The configuration is based on the eighteenth-century origin of the Wren
Chapel, which links the chapel to other historic re-creations within the Wren Building
and in the adjacent Colonial Williamsburg, all of which attempt to replicate mid-
eighteenth-century appearance.288 Second, and more important for the current inquiry,
the configuration of the Wren Chapel does not superimpose the content or experience
of Christian worship on others who use the facility. Instead, the fixtures are capable
of use for virtually any religious content. The texts of any tradition can be read from
282 See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text; see also Henne, supra note 148.
283 UPTON, supra note 280, at 9-10, 47-62; Henne, supra note 148.
284 DAVIS & RAWLINGS, supra note 119, at 12-19; UPTON, supra note 280, at 50.
285 UPTON, supra note 280, at 47-50.
286 Id.
287 See, e.g., Henne, supra note 148.
288 KALE, supra note 31, at 124-25 (discussing colonial restoration); KORNWOLF, supra note
44, at 60-65 (discussing decisions made in restoration of the Wren Building). See generally
PARKE ROUSE, JR., WHEN WILLIAMSBURG WOKE UP: DR. GOODWIN, MR. ROCKEFELLER,
AND THE RESTORATION (1976) (describing the restoration of the city and College to a colonial
period appearance).
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the lectern or pulpit, and the religious objects of any faith can be placed on the altar-
table. We do not imply here that the physical trappings of Protestant worship rep-
resent a religious norm or even the lowest common denominator among Christians.
Rather, our claim is only that the chapel can serve as a multi-faith accommodation of
student, rather than government, choice of religious experience. The space, although
rich in theological meaning, does not express a unique fitness for Christian worship.
But permanent display of the cross on the altar of the Wren Chapel is an entirely
different matter. Unlike the chapel's communion table or pulpit, the permanent dis-
play of the cross on the altar cannot readily be harmonized with non-Christian use of
the space. The right of students to request removal of the cross does not ameliorate
the problem, because the defect rests in the government's decision about the content
of the accommodation, not in government compulsion of students to participate in the
accommodation.289 By selecting Christianity as the default faith of the chapel, the
College departed from the role as facilitator of student religious experience and under-
took responsibility for determining the presumptive content of that experience.
Imagine, for an analogical example, that all students entering the school were
assumed to be Episcopalian unless they specifically informed the religious life coordi-
nator that they had a different religious preference. The coordinator then invited all
students--except those who specified otherwise-to Episcopalian events and arranged
for Episcopalian campus ministers to have access to all non-objecting students. Such
a practice obviously violates the requirement of religious neutrality, discussed below,
but it also violates the government's obligation not to choose the religious content of
an accommodation. By so choosing, the government asserts its jurisdictional com-
petence over the life of faith, and such an assertion represents a core violation of the
Establishment Clause, whether or not any student suffers a personal injury within the
meaning of Article 1m1.
The story would be considerably more complicated if the cross had been a perma-
nent architectural feature of the chapel, affixed to or carved in a wall, or portrayed
in a stained-glass window. If so, the college would have had plausible reasons for
declining to remove the religious symbol between Christian worship services,2"
289 Although related, the requirements of voluntariness and privately-selected content are
independently necessary conditions. In Schempp, for example, a student could opt out of par-
ticipation in the religious exercises, but that right to object did not save the constitutionality
of the practice. Sch. Dist. Of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 208 (1963). And in
Wallace, no student was required to pray or otherwise use the moment-of-silence for religious
activity, but the Court nonetheless held the provision unconstitutional because the state was
promoting religious experience. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 57 n.45 (1985).
290 A decision not to remove a permanently-affixed symbol would reasonably be
explained-and understood-as a desire not to damage or destroy an existing structure. In
contrast, a decision not to remove an entirely portable item carries no such implications. See
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (claiming that removal
of a longstanding large granite monument of the Ten Commandments from a state house
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although a sanctuary that is pervasively decorated with images of a particular faith
may ultimately prove unsuitable as a multi-faith chapel.29" ' But because the Wren
Chapel cross was easily moved from the altar, a decision not to withdraw the symbol
from that place of prominence would make the government responsible for selecting
that symbol as the present-day default religious orientation of the chapel.
C. Religious Neutrality
To survive constitutional scrutiny, an accommodation must be formally available
to all faiths. This requirement of religious equality embodies the core of most con-
temporary Establishment Clause theories.292 Nearly all treat neutrality as a necessary
feature, and some regard equal treatment of faiths as sufficient to comply with the
demands of the Clause. Most of the Court's accommodation decisions identify neu-
trality as an element of the constitutional analysis, but the question of equality proved
central in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet.293 In Kiryas Joel, the Court
struck down a special school district that the State of New York had created for the
Village of Kiryas Joel, which is comprised almost entirely of members of the Satmar
Hasidic religious community. 294 The Court held that creation of the school district
violated the Establishment Clause because the benefit of such a district was not gen-
erally available to other religious groups and the needs of Satmar Hasidim could have
been met without recourse to the special preference.295
Religious accommodations in a public university should satisfy the requirement
of neutrality as long as the school grants access and distributes resources according
to non-discriminatory criteria. For example, allocation of worship space and time
should be based on criteria that permit all groups to compete equally for advantageous
slots, although the relative size of groups and intra-faith heterogeneity may be legiti-
mate considerations.296 If the religious life coordinator serves as a gatekeeper, any
grounds is likely to be perceived as governmental hostility to religion, and will also promote
religious conflict). But see Gingrich & Levenick, supra note 145 (arguing that decisionmakers
regarding the Wren Chapel cross should have avoided the conflict generated even by removal
of the portable cross, and that application of the Establishment Clause should emphasize avoid-
ance of conflict with settled practices).
291 See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
292 For a discussion of various theories that embody some concept of neutrality, see Douglas
Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 51 (2007).
293 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
294 Id. at 696. For criticism of the Court's opinion in Kiryas Joel, see Thomas C. Berg,
Slouching Toward Secularism: A Comment on Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet, 44
EMORY L.J. 433 (1995); Abner Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1996).
295 Grumet, 512 U.S. at 702-07.
296 For example, a school need not have an equal number of hours of use of religious
facilities available for Christians, Jews, and Muslims if there are a dozen Christian groups
on campus and only one or two groups of the other faiths.
2008]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
decisions should be based on clear and published policies applicable to all faiths (and
biased against none), explaining the basis for any adverse action, and providing a
reasonable opportunity to appeal.
The requirement of religious neutrality also applies to the configuration of
chapels. Regulations governing the use and appearance of military chapels reflect
this obligation. The rules provide that:
(1) All distinctive faith groups represented in the command may
use these facilities on a space available basis.
(4) The chapel environment will be religiously neutral when the
facility is not being used for scheduled worship.
(5) Chapels must be available to people of all faith groups for
meditation and prayer when formal religious services are not
scheduled.297
As we discussed in the previous Section, configuration of a chapel is likely to
reflect culture-bound assumptions about religious experience.298 Even something as
seemingly innocuous as the permanent installation of pews embodies such an assump-
tion, as illustrated by the fact that some faith traditions do not use seating during
worship.299 Although the government should take such considerations into account in
constructing new worship facilities, the failure to do so in the past does not mean that
the government has violated the requirement of neutrality. As long as the worship
space is available for use by all faiths, the government will have met its obligation.
But availability demands more than mere eligibility; it means that a faith group may
use the chapel without having the religious messages of another tradition superim-
posed on their own worship. At a minimum, this means that the government must
remove or provide some way of covering any faith-specific symbols or messages
during worship by other faith traditions.
Seen in this light, the Wren Chapel now generally satisfies the standard of neu-
trality. Although the architecture and fixtures belong to a particular religious tradition
and manifest theological commitments of that tradition, such manifestations do not
materially impede other groups' use o f the space. The table and lectern are equally
available for use, without regard to the worship materials or religious texts placed
297 U.S. Dep't of the Army, Army Regulation 165-1, Religious Activities: Chaplain
Activities in the United States Army para. 13-3.c (Mar. 25, 2004), available at http://www
.usapa.anny.mil/pdffiles/r165.1 .pdf. Similar regulations govern chapels in the other military
services and at Department of Veterans Affairs healthcare facilities.
298 See supra Part III.B.
299 The most notable example is Islam; mosques do not have seating in the worship space.
See, e.g., Religions in Canada: Islam, http://www.forces.gc.ca/hr/religions/engraph/religions 18
_e.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
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on them. Indeed, even the chapel's consecration as an Anglican place of worship does
not deprive other faiths of their equal opportunity to use the space. Any faith tradition
could similarly conduct a ritual to sanctify the space for its own worship. Any attempt
to block such rituals in the name of protecting a prior faith's consecration would
violate the requirement of neutrality.3"
Under this criterion, permanent display of the cross on the Wren Chapel altar fails
the standard of neutrality for a religious accommodation. In the context of a chapel
actively used by a variety of faiths, permanent display of the cross suggests that
Christianity is the favored or even official religion, while other faiths are merely tol-
erated. Toleration, however, is fundamentally different from accommodation. In a
regime of toleration, the government supports a particular faith and permits other
faiths to worship freely.301 In a regime of accommodation, the government provides
equal support for the free religious exercise of all its citizens and remains indifferent
to the content, success, or historic position of any particular faith.
D. Burdens on Third Parties
The final criterion requires attention to any hardship an accommodation might
impose on third parties, although it is unlikely to be a significant element in consid-
eration of public universities' support for student religious experience. The Court
invoked this criterion in Caldor when it struck down a rule that protected employees'
Sabbath observance; 302 the Court held that the rule extended the protection without
appropriately considering the costs that employers and fellow employees would be
required to bear in order to provide for such observance.3 3 In Cutter v. Wilkinson,3° 4
the Court returned to this theme when it held that the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) should be interpreted to provide adequate protection
for the security interests of prison guards and fellow inmates.30 5
The religious accommodations at issue on public university campuses do not pose
the serious risk of hardship or personal injury to others at issue in Caldor and Cutter.
Indeed, if an accommodation is implemented consistently with the first three criteria,
it would be hard to imagine anyone experiencing a burden that would be reasonably
attributable to the accommodation. The accommodation merely creates an equal
opportunity for voluntary religious experience within the campus community. Those
" No religious community is entitled to a privileged position in state-controlled space based
on some theory of prior-perhaps adverse-possession.
301 See, e.g., Charles A. Rees, Remarkable Evolution: The Early Constitutional History
of Maryland, 36 U. BALT. L. REV. 229 (2007) (discussing religious toleration in colonial
Maryland).
302 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
303 Id. at 709-11.
304 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
305 Id. at 722-26.
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who do not want to participate in the offered religious experience are free to exercise
that choice, without any pressure from school officials. Those who want to participate
in the activity have an equal right to use resources that the school makes available for
that purpose.
IV. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RELIGION
Contemporary Establishment Clause doctrine offers a second path for attempting
to justify permanent display of the Wren Chapel cross-the idea that the government
does not violate the Clause when it merely "acknowledges" religion. Although Justices
and commentators have often used the terms "accommodation" and "acknowledgment"
interchangeably, 3°6 the two terms refer to distinct practices and theories ofjustification.
The government accommodates religion when it removes an identifiable, government-
imposed burden in order to facilitate someone's religious exercise. Acknowledgment
of religion has a less definite source and limit, but it generally involves an official
practice or message that has religious content and serves a public purpose. °7
The idea of acknowledgment has been an important theme in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence since the early 1980s, when the Court relied on the idea in deciding two
cases involving religious expression by the government: Marsh v. Chambers3°8 and
Lynch v. Donnelly.3°9 In Marsh, the Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge
to the practice of state-sponsored prayer in the Nebraska legislature,31° and in Lynch,
the Court rejected a challenge to the city of Pawtucket's Christmas display.3 1 Chief
Justice Burger wrote the majority opinions in both cases, and he used a similar
306 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 684 & n.3 (2005); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,657 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
673-74 (1984); ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1495 (3d Cir.
1996) (Mansmann, J., dissenting). Many commentators follow the courts' interchangeable use
of the terms. See, e.g., Christopher B. Harwood, Evaluating the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence in the Wake of Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County v. ACLU,
71 Mo. L. REv. 317, 340-41 (2006); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Searching for the Soul of Judicial
Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study ofReligious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491,
603 (2004).
307 For a thorough and recent account and analysis of the standards governing the expres-
sion of religious messages by the state, see Daniel O'Conkle, The Establishment Clause and
Religious Expression in Governmental Settings: Four Variables in Search of a Standard, 110
W. VA. L. REv. 315 (2007).
308 463 U.S. 783 (1983). A number of Justices had earlier advanced the idea that
government should be permitted to recognize the importance of religion. See Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952); Illinois exrel. McCollum, 333 U.S. 203,244 (1948)
(Reed, J., dissenting).
'09 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
310 Marsh, 463 U.S. 783.
311 Lynch, 465 U.S. 668.
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argument to uphold both practices."' Burger reasoned that the history of the Establish-
ment Clause does not support a strict separation of church and state.313 Instead, he
asserted that history reflects a pattern of official recognition of religion's significance,
manifest in prayers before official events, presidential proclamations of thanksgiving,
official observance of holidays that are religiously significant, public display of reli-
gious art, and references to religious ideas on the currency, in the national motto, and
in the Pledge of Allegiance.314 He summarized the argument in the claim that "[tihere
is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of govern-
ment of the role of religion in American life from at least 1789. "315
During the past quarter-century, the idea of acknowledgment has remained a
central theme in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, representing an alternative to
separationist constraints on official expression of religion. In County of Allegheny v.
ACL U,316 Justice Kennedy's partial dissent relied on the idea of acknowledgment to
argue for the constitutionality of a creche display in the courthouse.317 Dissenting in
Lee v. Weisman318 and McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky,319 Justice Scalia also
invoked the concept of acknowledgment. On both occasions, Scalia reasoned that the
Establishment Clause should not bar public acknowledgment, through prayer or dis-
plays, of theistic beliefs because such beliefs were widely held among the Founders
and are still broadly shared among the nation's citizens.32
As we argue in this Part, the idea of acknowledgment is complex and ambiguous,
but the Wren Chapel cross offers an especially useful context for exploring the idea.
Such an exploration is especially important, because those who invoke the concept of
acknowledgment are often unclear about its meaning or scope. Through this explo-
ration, we identify three quite distinct understandings of religious acknowledgment:
321 322 32cltrahistorical accuracy, ' reverence, and cultural recognition.323 We evaluate the
312 See id.; Marsh, 463 U.S. 783.
311 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672-78.; Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786-90.
314 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673-78.
315 Id. at 674; see Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (upholding the constitutionality of governmental
"acknowledgment of beliefs widely held").
316 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
317 Id. at 657-60 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
311 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
319 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
320 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 893-900 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lee, 505 U.S. at 644-46
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 687 (2005) (stating that the Court
has recognized and acknowledged "the role of God in our Nation's heritage"); Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 30 (2004) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (finding the
phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance is a permissible "public recognition of our
Nation's religious history and character").
32 See infra Part IV.A.
322 See infra Part IV.B.
323 See infra Part IV.C.
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constitutional premises underlying each concept of acknowledgment, and we suggest
how each would apply to permanent display of the Wren Chapel cross.
A. Acknowledgment as Historical Accuracy
The first understanding of acknowledgment is the most restrictive and least con-
troversial of the three. Acknowledgment as historical accuracy represents the modest
assertion that the government may officially recognize the significance of religious
groups, movements, and ideas as a part of our cultural and national history.3 24 For
example, the National Park Service, which maintains the Mormon Pioneer National
Historic Trail, may explain why the pioneers were emigrating.3 25 Such acknowledg-
ments of religion involve descriptive rather than normative claims about religion.
The sharpest illustration of this distinction arises in public schools, which are
permitted by the Constitution to teach about religion but forbidden to engage in reli-
gious inculcation. 3' That distinction, however, sometimes proves elusive or difficult
to administer. For example, when some school systems have attempted to implement
programs of instruction about religious topics, the classes have been challenged over
the content of the curriculum based on allegations that the programs failed to maintain
a consistently descriptive attitude toward the subject.327 More frequently, however,
324 See Kent Greenawalt, Establishing Religious Ideas: Evolution, Creationism, and
Intelligent Design, 17 NOTREDAMEJ.L. ETHIcs & PUB POL'Y 321,332-34 (2003) (discussing
relationship between religion and science instruction in public schools); Kent Greenawalt,
Teaching About Religion in the Public Schools, 18 J.L. & POL. 329, 340-65 (2002) (dis-
cussing instruction about religion in public schools); Jay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and
Disestablishment: Teaching the Evolution Controversy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L. REV.
751,776-84 (2003) (discussing why teachers should teach about religious views on origins);
Caroline Elizabeth Branch, Comment, UnexcusedAbsence: Why Public Schools in Religiously
Plural Society Must Save a Seatfor Religion in the Curriculum, 56 EMoRY L.J. 1431, 1464-73
(2007) (discussing the incorporation of instruction about religion in public schools).
325 See, Mormon Pioneer Nat'l Historic Trail, U.S. Nat'l Park Serv., http://www.nps.gov/
mopi (last visited Feb. 18, 2008). Subsidy for the historic preservation of religious structures
raises the same question of religious acknowledgment as that raised by religion and national
parks. See generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants to Houses
of Worship: A Case Study in the Survival of Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1139 (2002)
(discussing permissible and impermissible funding of religious facilities).
326 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,225 (1963) ("Nothing we have
said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively
as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First
Amendment"). See generally CHARLES C. HAYNES & OLIVER THOMAS, Religion in the
Public School Curriculum: Questions andAnswers, in FINDING COMMON GROUND: A GUIDE
TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 89 (2001) (advising schools boards on how
to teach religion constitutionally), available at http://www.freedomforum.org/publications/
first/findingcommonground/B07.inPublicSchool.pdf.
327 See, e.g., Doe v. Porter, 188 F. Supp. 2d 904 (E.D. Tenn. 2002), aff'd, 370 F.3d 558 (6th
Cir. 2004) (holding that Bible classes conducted in public schools violated the Establishment
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the programs have been challenged over the implementation of the religion curric-
ulum, as teachers redirected the courses to serve religious purposes.32 Thus, even if
it is uncontroversial as a matter of principle that government may acknowledge the
historical significance of religion, implementation of the principle-especially in
public primary and secondary schools-is likely to be more controversial because of
the difficulty of controlling those who provide the lessons about religion's significance.
Even if government actors hew closely to the goal of religious description, issues
may arise concerning the accuracy of the purported acknowledgment. The govern-
ment does not establish religion when it offers a reasonable account of how religion
affected past events. Of course, that argument invites a host of further questions.
These include philosophical questions about what should count as truthful or rea-
sonable accounts, as well as institutional concerns over which agency of government
gets the final say in what counts as reasonably accurate. Answers to these questions
are closely related because if one believes that historical accuracy is unattainable,
then one is also likely to believe that democratic institutions should have the final
word.329 If, however, one believes that statements about history can be falsified, then
one might also believe that the courts should play a role in policing acknowledgments
of religion.
For purposes of this Article, we assume that historical statements can be falsi-
fied, though we confess uncertainty about the extent to which the courts should defer
to arguable but unpersuasive historical claims.330 Debates over display of the Ten
Commandments offer a useful illustration. Proponents of such displays often argue
that the displays acknowledge the Commandments' role as the historical foundations
Clause because content of instruction was devotional); Gibson v. Lee County Sch. Bd., 1 F.
Supp. 2d 1426 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (partially granting an injunction based on an Establishment
Clause challenge to curriculum of Bible history courses in public schools).
328 See, e.g., Crockett v. Sorenson, 568 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Va. 1983) (holding that Bible
study classes in public schools violated the Establishment Clause because control over in-
struction was delegated to religious officials without adequate public supervision); see also
Doe, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 913-14 (finding an impermissible delegation to religious institution
of public school instruction).
329 On a related question, see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 611-36 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (arguing that a statute requiring a public school science curriculum to adopt
"balanced treatment" of evolution and creation science does not violate the Establishment
Clause because the Court should defer to legislative judgments about academic content).
330 Most recently, this question has arisen in connection with debates over the teaching of
intelligent design in public schools. Proponents of intelligent design assert that the theory ad-
dresses scientific claims about weaknesses in Darwinian evolution and thus should be permitted
in the public school science curriculum. Opponents argue that the theory of intelligent design
does not meet widely accepted criteria for science. Opponents have thus far prevailed in
court. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (holding
that reference to Intelligent Design theory in public school science curriculum violated the
Establishment Clause because the theory is religious, not scientific, in character).
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of the common law.33' Many medieval and early modem legal writers made the same
assertion, although very few contemporary legal historians would agree.3 32 Modem
scholarship generally locates the roots of the common law tradition in pre-Christian
Anglo-Saxon sources. 333 The persistence of historical claims in the face of significant
evidence to the contrary does suggest that the argument from history is a pretext for
normative claims about the importance of respecting and obeying the Commandments.
As we discuss below, officials, and reviewing courts, often interweave descriptive
acknowledgments of religion with normative religious claims; in such cases, unper-
suasive descriptive assertions should be evaluated with a deeply skeptical eye.
Opponents of President Nichol's decision to remove the Wren Chapel cross
frequently invoked the argument that permanent display of the cross represented
an acknowledgment of religion's historical role at the College.3' The underlying
basis for the claim is indisputable. As we described in Part I, the College was largely
founded for religious purposes and maintained its identity as a church institution until
at least the Civil War.335 But the argument fails to specify or clarify the relationship
between that history and permanent display of the cross on the chapel altar.
The problem is not the age of the cross, because both the chapel interior and cross
date from roughly the same period, the 1930S.336 In the 1931 restoration of the Wren
Building, however, the chapel's Victorian-era configuration was removed and replaced
with the present reproduction of mid-eighteenth century-design of worship space.337
The decision to replicate eighteenth-century design was not accidental or arbitrary.338
131 See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 856-57 (2005) (describing the
claim by the government that the Ten Commandments represent a historical foundation for
legal system); see also id. at 904-05, 910-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accepting government
claim about historical basis for display of the Ten Commandments).
332 See, e.g., Brief of Baptist Joint Committee and the Interfaith Alliance Foundation as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 20-23, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)
(No. 03-1500), 2004 WL 2899175; Brief of Legal Historians and Law Scholars as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6-13, McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844
(2005) (No. 03-1693), 2005 WL 166586; see also Steven K. Green, "Bad History": The
Lure of History in Establishment Clause Adjudication, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1717,
1746-47 (2006).
333 Brief of Baptist Joint Committee, supra note 332, at 20-23.
" See, e.g., J. Edward Grimsley, Editorial, What Would the Founders Think Today?,
RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, Feb. 8, 2007, at A13; Linda Arey Skladany, Editorial, Cross
Controversy Is Less About Religion Than History & Heritage, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Mar. 7, 2007, at A15; Regent's Voice, supra note 8.
31 See supra Part I.
336 See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
337 See KORNWOLF, supra note 44, at 64-65.
338 Henne argues that "restoring an institution or a building to any given point in its linear
history is to accomplish 'historical accuracy,' as far as that moment in time is concerned. There-
fore, the restoration reference point for a five-hundred-year-old building may rightly fall
within the past hundred years." Henne, supra note 148. The claim is true but highly misleading
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That era defines the identities of both the College of William and Mary and the City
of Williamsburg. Those identities find their distinctiveness, and help attract students
and tourists, by emphasizing the links among the town, the College, and the nation's
founding generation.339
In a representation of an eighteenth-century chapel, however, the altar cross is
glaringly anachronistic. Anglican churches of that era did not place crosses on the
altar because they viewed such adornments as remnants of Roman Catholicism.
34°
That belief continued well into the nineteenth century, until the Oxford Movement
led many Anglican congregations to adopt a more ornamented style of worship.341
Instead of a cross, the altar of an eighteenth-century Anglican church would have
been adorned with a communion plate and cup, often made of silver or gold. 4 2
The anachronism undermines the purported intent to acknowledge the school's
religious origins. Because the cross display is not an accurate representation of
eighteenth-century worship space, the display communicates a different message-
that the chapel is now a place set apart for Christian worship, rather than simply that
it was originally constructed for that purpose. Other religiously distinctive symbols
could have been justified as historical acknowledgments. For example, churches of
the period often had an altarpiece inscribed with the Decalogue or, as noted above,
displayed a communion plate and cup on the altar. 3 But the altar cross lacks any
plausible connection to eighteenth-century worship practice.
when applied in the context of the Wren Building and Chapel, A five-hundred-year-old
building may be restored to a point representing only a century past, but no one can reason-
ably believe that the Wren Chapel was restored to its appearance in 1940, 1900, or any point
subsequent to the 1859 fire that destroyed the colonial-era structure. If the chapel interior had
been configured to represent a Victorian or Edwardian Anglican worship space, then display
of the cross would have been historically appropriate. But the Wren Building and Chapel
were restored to reflect the colonial era, so the altar cross is not part of an historically
accurate display.
... See ROUSE, supra note 42, at 180-85; see also The Sir Christopher Wren Building,
http://www.wm.edu/about/wrenlindex.php (last visited Jan. 25, 2008) (describing building
as "oldest academic building in continuous use in the United States"). The College's distinc-
tiveness has long been based on its claim to antiquity. See, e.g., LYON G. TYLER, A FEW FACTS
FROM THE RECORDS OF WILLIAM AND MARY COLLEGE, in 4 PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN
HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 129-41 (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1890).
340 See DAVIS & RAWLINGS, supra note 119, at 238-43 (using maps to show typical
Anglican Churches in colonial times); UPTON, supra note 280, at 118-19; Henne, supra
note 148.
31 John Edward Joyner IlI, The Architecture of Orthodox Anglicanism in the Antebellum
South 1 (Dec. 1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, College of Architecture, Ga. Inst. of Tech.).
On the Oxford Movement, see generally Larry Crockett, The Oxford Movement and the 19th-
Century Episcopal Church: Anglo-Catholic Ecclesiology and the American Experience, 1
QUOUDLIBET ONLINE J. (1999), http://www.quodlibet.net/crockett-oxford.shtml.
342 UPTON, supra note 280, at 152-55.
313 DAVIS &RAWUNGS, supra note 119, at 21-24,280; UPTON, supra note 280, at 120-33,
147-55.
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If the presence of the cross on the chapel's altar table was historically accurate,
would it be constitutional for a public college to support such a display? Under an anti-
endorsement theory of non-establishment, the relevant question would be whether a
reasonable observer would perceive such a display as a state endorsement of Christian-
ity.3' Although an affirmative answer to that question seems obvious at first glance,
the problem is not as simple as it appears. Under the current law, reasonable observers
are presumed to know the history of the relevant place,"45 so perhaps such observers
would understand that the state intended the display to recognize a historical truth-
rather than manifest a reverential attitude-about the use of icons in the chapel.
In contrast, a theory that used the symbol's obvious religious significance to
trigger a shift in the burden of persuasion might make a significant difference in the
evaluation of the display. If its constitutionality depended on the state being able
to show that the display was an acknowledgment of history rather than a manifestation
of religious belief, the state would have to affirmatively demonstrate that the display
was in service of such a historical account. In the case of a functioning college chapel,
the state presumably would be obliged to put up the appropriate signs and labels in the
worship space so that virtually all observers-not just the hypothetical, reasonable
ones-would be able to see that the state was capturing the historically accurate con-
figuration of the space rather than expressing contemporary reverence for a Christian
symbol. The difference between "endorsement" theory and "acknowledgment" theory,
properly understood, thus in some circumstances will make it more difficult for the
state to promote a religious faith in the guise of serving other, legitimate goals.
President Nichol did not defend his decision to remove the cross as a restoration
of historic authenticity, and the defense seems only to have been identified by those
responding to opponents of that decision.3" But we are focused only on the legal
reasons that would have allowed the College to leave the cross on permanent display,
not the reasons for its removal from the altar. Permanent display of the cross lacks
the historical accuracy required to justify it as an acknowledgment under this first
definition of that term.
B. Acknowledgment as Reverence
The second interpretation of religious acknowledgment is far more controversial
than the first. The historical version of acknowledgment is descriptive, but acknowl-
edgment as an expression of reverence is not only normative but performative. It
3" Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 772-74 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing anti-endorsement approach to Establishment Clause
analysis); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,628 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(same).
145 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779-82.
346 See Henne, supra note 148 (claiming that the argument about historical inaccuracy of
the cross display was raised by College professors Melvin Ely and Rhys Isaac, not by
President Nichol).
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represents an act of worship by the political community. The official act of acknowl-
edgment is directed to God as a collective recognition of divinity. This understanding
is categorically different from acknowledgment as a reflection of historical or cultural
reference points. Those two focus attention on religion as a human phenomenon,
either in the past or present. In stark contrast, acknowledgment as reverence consti-
tutes participation in the intrinsically religious act of worship."47
This reverential conception of religious acknowledgment has surfaced only recently
in contemporary Establishment Clause jurisprudence and has not yet commanded a
majority of the Court. Dissenting in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, Justice
Scalia wrote: "Historical practices thus demonstrate that there is a distance between
the acknowledgment of a single Creator and the establishment of a religion.""48 Con-
curring in Van Orden v. Perry, he made the point even more explicitly: "[T]here is
nothing unconstitutional in a State's favoring religion generally, honoring God through
public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the
Ten Commandments." '349 For Scalia, the people collectively-acting through their
agent, the government-may properly engage in worship of God.350
Scalia' s argument in McCreary County and Van Orden only makes explicit what
had long been an unstated implication of the term "acknowledgment." Perhaps the
earliest and best example of this can be found in Justice Douglas's opinion for the
Court in Zorach v. Clauson, in which he wrote that "[w]e are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. '35' Justice Douglas's assertion tracks
Justice Scalia's claim about acknowledgment in three important respects. First, it
links the people and government in a single religious identity. Second, it suggests-
albeit much more ambiguously than Justice Scalia does-a particular religious atti-
tude, which is implied by the term "presuppose." It is possible that Justice Douglas
meant the term only as an historical claim about the importance of religion to the
nation's founders, but his use of the present tense indicates that the presupposition is
ongoing. In other words, the Supreme Being remains, in some sense, at the foundation
of the nation's institutions. Third, Justice Douglas's statement identifies the object of
that religious attitude in generically monotheistic but nondenominational language.
As sketched in Justice Scalia's McCreary County dissent and Van Orden con-
currence, the idea of acknowledgment as reverence would permit official expressions
of support for religion, public religious displays, and prayer before civic events.352
" For an intriguing argument that the government may promote or sponsor acts of rever-
ence in times of crisis, see William P. Marshall, The Limits of Secularism: Public Religious
Expression in Moments of National Crisis and Tragedy, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 11 (2002).
14' 545 U.S. 844, 894 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'49 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
350 See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 899 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35 ' 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
352 See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 885-911; Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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Justice Scalia derived his understanding of permissible religious acknowledgment
from a reading of Establishment Clause history,353 and that history also provides the
two limiting principles on his account of acknowledgment. Such acknowledgments,
he asserted, violate the Establishment Clause only if individuals are compelled to
participate in the communal religious activity354 or if the activity involves religious
claims that are narrower and more specific than the inclusive monotheism embraced
by the founders.355
Justice Scalia' s concept of acknowledgment has generated a vigorous reaction, 356
primarily because his interpretation jettisoned the obligation of religious neutrality,
which has been the keystone of Establishment Clause jurisprudence since the Court's
decision in Everson v. Board of Education357 inaugurated the modem era of that juris-
prudence. On Justice Scalia's reading, the government has no obligation to be neutral
between religion and non-religion, or even between monotheism and other religious
traditions. 35' The requirement of official neutrality extends only to monotheist faiths.3 59
Government must not endorse or denigrate any specific faith but is otherwise free to
support or engage in generically monotheist worship and religious expression.
This understanding of reverential acknowledgment, however, is unlikely to be
helpful to those who support permanent display of the Wren Chapel cross. On a prac-
tical level, Justice Scalia's articulations of this idea in McCreary County and Van
Orden were joined only by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist. 36 ° Justice
Kennedy joined other parts of Justice Scalia's dissent in McCreary County, but not
the portion containing the claims about the permissibility of government-sponsored
worship.361 Even if Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito eventually chose to adopt
151 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 886-87.
Id. at 908-09.
35 Id. at 909.
356 See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia,
the Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 Nw. U. L. REV.
1097 (2006). For a reply to Professor Colby, see Kyle Duncan, Bringing Scalia's Decalogue
Dissent Down from the Mountain, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 287. For the record, we too reject the
notion that the government may appropriately act in the mode of worship or veneration
towards God. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 135, at 83-84 (describing how the Constitution
in general, and the Religion Clauses in particular, limit government to temporal concerns);
see also Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, UncivilReligion: Judeo-Christianity and
the Ten Commandments, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 275 (2007).
"1 330 U.S. 1 (1947). For recent invocations of the principle that government must be
neutral between religion and non-religion, see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639
(2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
358 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 899-900 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9 See id. at 909.
" Id. at 885 (specifying that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined the entire
dissent, but that Justice Kennedy joined only Parts II and III).
361 Id.
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the idea of reverential acknowledgment, Justice Kennedy's opposition would prevent
it from gaining a majority of the present Court.
More importantly, display of the cross does not fall within Scalia's definition of
a permissible acknowledgment because it represents a set of quite distinctive claims
about the person and work of God, rather than an inclusive recognition of the
"Supreme Being." Even under Justice Scalia's expansive concept of reverential
acknowledgment, official recognition of Christianity's distinctive symbol violates
the Establishment Clause.
C. Acknowledgment as Cultural Recognition
The third potential understanding of acknowledgment is the most frequently used
but also the most complicated, largely because of its inherent ambiguity. Under the
concept of cultural recognition, the state may acknowledge the important role of reli-
gion within the social and political community. In contrast to the historical version,
cultural acknowledgment focuses on the contemporary significance of religion. But
the two versions are alike-and distinguishable from the reverential account-in that
they are both intended to be descriptive. The government acknowledges religion but
does not itself engage in worship. The ambiguities of cultural recognition arise from
the frequent difficulties of separating the descriptive act of acknowledgment from
normative and reverential promotion by the government of religious experience.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in Lynch v. Donnelly 362 represents
the most prominent example of the cultural acknowledgment theory. The plaintiffs
in Lynch challenged the inclusion of a creche in a city-sponsored Christmas display.363
They argued that the crche was a distinctly religious symbol, and the city's embrace
of that symbol reflected impermissible government support for religion.364 In rejecting
the challenge, the Court pointed to the history of public recognition of religion and
focused particularly on longstanding practices related to religious holidays. 365 For
example, Presidents and Congress issue proclamations that commemorate religious
holidays, governments close their offices and give workers paid vacations, and cities
across the country erect displays to express public celebration of the holiday season.366
The Establishment Clause does not prohibit official recognition of religion as
long as the act of recognition has a secular purpose, determined by each specific
factual context.367 In Lynch, the Court found such a purpose in the celebration of the
Christmas holiday, which has taken on an independent secular significance and thus
362 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
363 Id. at 670-72.
364 Id.
361 Id. at 674-78.
366 Id. at 674-85.
367 See id. at 680-81.
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become part of the broader culture.368 Within the broad context of a display cele-
brating this cultural holiday, the Court reasoned, the city should be able to include
a reference to the religious roots of the holiday.369
The reasoning in Lynch is easily mistaken for the historical version of acknowl-
edgment, or confused with the idea of accommodation, but it is a distinct approach.
Under the historical version, constitutional validity of the message depends on its
accuracy. Thus, a National Park Service plaque at Monticello could properly indicate
that Thomas Jefferson donated funds to churches but not that Jefferson held
traditional Christian beliefs about Jesus Christ.370 Under the idea of accommodation,
particular government-imposed burdens on religious exercise give rise to and justify
the government's support for religious experience. Under the cultural version of
acknowledgment, however, the government is neither bound by the requirement of
historical accuracy nor limited to relief of government-imposed burdens. Cultural
acknowledgments respond to the religious experiences and preferences of the
populace, but response to popular demand alone cannot justify the acknowledgment.
If demand were sufficient, the government would have virtually unlimited discretion
to highlight and celebrate the religious beliefs of the majority or those who are
politically influential.
Thus, in Lynch, the Court held that acknowledgments of religion must further a
secular purpose 371 independent of the reinforcement or affirmation of popular reli-
gious beliefs, although the purpose of the acknowledgment need not be exclusively
secular.372 Celebration of the Christmas holiday, the Court reasoned, has a legitimate
secular purpose because the holiday possesses cultural and commercial aspects that
have significance independent of the Christian meaning or origins of the event.373
Moreover, the Court permitted the city to include within its display a reference to
the religious origins of the event.374 That reference-the creche-did not transform
the entire display into a religious message.375 Instead, the cr&he recognized the con-
tribution of religion to the overall cultural experience of the holiday.376
The idea of cultural acknowledgment in Lynch depends heavily on the logic devel-
oped earlier in McGowan v. Maryand,3 77 in which the Court rejected an Establishment
Clause challenge to a law that required most places of business to close on Sundays.
368 Id.
369 Id. at 685-86.
170 See HoLMES, FArrHs OFTHE FOUNDING FATHERS, supra note 69, at 86-87 (describing
Jefferson's religious beliefs).
371 465 U.S. at 680-81.
372 Id. at 681, n.6.
171 Id. at 680-85.
374 Id. at 685-86.
371 Id. at 685.
376 Id. at 684-85.
377 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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The plaintiffs, who had been charged with selling goods on Sunday, argued that the
law was unconstitutional because it was intended to encourage attendance at Christian
churches."' Although such laws had religious origins, the Court reasoned that legis-
lation requiring a uniform day of rest was justified by its beneficial effect on social
welfare. 379 The choice of Sunday as the state's coordinated day of respite from
business did not reflect a preference for Christianity, but rather a recognition of the
practice already adopted by a majority of the state's citizens, including many non-
Christians. 30 The Establishment Clause did not require the state to ignore existing
and widespread social practices when selecting the weekly day of rest.381 As in Lynch,
the cultural acknowledgment of religion was justified by a secular purpose that had
significance independent of and distinguishable from the religious content of the
acknowledgment.8 2
Not all acts of alleged cultural recognition pass this test. In County ofAllegheny
v. ACLU, a splintered Supreme Court invalidated a display of a stand-alone Christmas
creche on the landing of a prominent staircase in the county courthouse but upheld
the display of a Christmas tree alongside a Chanukah menorah and peace sign outside
the county municipal building.38 3 The display of the creche alone, the Court ruled,
celebrated the religious meaning of the holiday and lacked connection to the day's
secular significance.3 4 In contrast, the combination of multiple holiday symbols with
a peace sign in the outdoor display was sufficient for seven Justices to conclude that
this arrangement recognized the cultural significance of the holiday season for many
in the Pittsburgh area.385
Similarly, the Court's disposition of the Ten Commandments cases, decided in
2005, manifested precisely the same distinction between displays designed to rec-
ognize secular ideals or aspects of culture and displays designed to promote religious
principles. 6 In McCreary County, a five-to-four majority parsed the history of the
378 Id. at431.
179 Id. at 446-52.
380 Id. at 451-52.
381 Id. at 452.
382 Similarly, approval of nonsectarian legislative prayer in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783 (1983), was premised on the secular purpose of solemnizing legislative procedures, as well
as the historically accurate acknowledgment of a longstanding practice of legislative prayer.
383 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
31 Id. at 598; see also id. at 623-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and
Stevens joined O'Connor's concurrence. Id.
385 The outdoor display included a Christmas tree and a Chanukah menorah. The opinions
upholding that display include the Court opinion, id. at 613-22; Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion, id. at 633-37; and Justice Kennedy's opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
id. at 655.
386 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S.
677 (2005).
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display of the Decalogue in the county courthouse and concluded that public officials
had posted the document for the purpose of celebrating its religious content." 7 The
majority saw the county officials' attempt to secularize the document by surround-
ing it with other historical materials concerning the relation of religion to law as pre-
textual3. rather than an authentic acknowledgment of the Ten Commandments' place
in the secular culture.
On the same day, a different five-to-four alignment in the Supreme Court pro-
duced a decision in Van Orden389 that upheld the display of the Ten Commandments
on the Texas state capitol grounds. In Van Orden, Justice Breyer's decisive concurring
opinion recognized that the monument had been accepted and prominently displayed
by the state in reflection of the secular state purpose of fighting juvenile delinquency
through moral education.39 ° In addition to recognizing this secular purpose, Breyer
also emphasized the divisive quality of removing a longstanding monument to which
many people in the community were attached for cultural and religious reasons.39'
However much one might question whether the factual differences between
McCreary County and Van Orden support the difference in result, the Ten Command-
ments cases sharply reinforce the constitutional requirement that cultural acknowledg-
ments of religious symbols or sentiments must credibly resonate with secular meaning
and secular goals in order to satisfy the Constitution. Moreover, as we suggest below,
the concern for divisiveness in the response to constitutionally questionable displays
is a prominent aspect of the story at William and Mary. The lower courts have proven
capable of administering the distinctions demanded by the theory of cultural acknowl-
edgment. In Doe v. Village of Crestwood, for example, the Seventh Circuit held uncon-
stitutional a city's practice of including Roman Catholic Mass as part of its festivals
celebrating Polish and Italian heritage.3 92 Contrasting the Mass with the creche at
issue in Lynch, the court found that celebration of the two cultures did not provide
a sufficient secular justification for city sponsorship of the worship service.3 93 Two
features of the case distinguished it from Lynch. First, the Mass involved an overt
act of worship, rather than just a display of a religious symbol.394 Second, the Mass
lacked a significant secular connection with the festival.395
These two considerations are conceptually linked. A government-supported act
of cultural acknowledgment that includes explicit and robust religious activity, such
387 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 867-73.
388 Id. at 873 n.22 (distinguishing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)).
389 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
31 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring).
391 See id. at 698-704.
392 917 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1218 (1992).
193 Id. at 1478-79.
194 Id. at 1478.
'9' Id. at 1478-80. The only link was language; the Mass was said in the language of the
culture being celebrated (either Italian or Polish). Id. at 1477.
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as the worship service challenged in Crestwood, should have a more obvious and
substantial secular justification than a passive display. In the absence of such a justi-
fication, the government's purported reasons for the acknowledgment may be, or are
likely to appear to be, a pretext designed to cover up a reverential acknowledgment.
During the controversy over the Wren Chapel cross, the idea of cultural acknowl-
edgment surfaced through an argument offered to defend permanent display of the
cross. Some opponents of the president's decision claimed that the pre-existing
display of the cross commemorated the long relationship between the College and
Bruton Parish Church.396 This argument was buttressed by the fact that the cross
was originally donated to the church in memory of a nineteenth-century professor
at William and Mary.3 97 At first glance, this claim resonates with the cultural acknowl-
edgment approach of McGowan and Lynch. Under this theory of permissible acknowl-
edgment, permanent display of the cross would be justified because it furthers the
secular purpose of symbolizing and celebrating the school's substantial bonds with
Bruton Parish, bonds that include the many college presidents who served as rectors
of that congregation.
As was the case in Village of Crestwood,398 however, the argument falters at the
connection between the precise details of the religious acknowledgment and its pur-
ported secular purpose. Permanent or default display of the cross on the chapel altar
offered virtually no visual cues that the College intended the cross to convey a mes-
sage about the school's links with Bruton Parish. Instead, the presentation indicated
only that the chapel was presumptively a place of Christian worship.
Recognition of the historic and ongoing relationship between the College and
Bruton Parish is a legitimate secular purpose, and the cross can be a constitutionally
acceptable element in conveying that recognition. In order to serve as cultural or his-
torical acknowledgment, however, the display must make the relationship between
College and church more apparent and less an afterthought to what seemed to be the
reverential purpose of the display. The compromise placement of the cross, in an
appropriately marked display case on the side wall of the chapel, is a far more defen-
sible acknowledgment of history and culture than the unadorned placement on the
altar. Moreover, leaving the cross within the chapel space, rather than relegating it
to a back room, helps ameliorate the potential divisiveness that proved decisive for
Justice Breyer (and thus to the outcome) in Van Orden v. Perry.399
396 See John Kennedy, Against William & Mary, AM. CONSERVATIVE UNION FOUND.,
available at http://www.acuf.org/issues/issue90/commentsmary.asp (last visited Jan. 25,2008);
Post of Beach Girl to Save the Wren Cross Blog, http://savethewrencross.blogspot.com/2006/
12/wren-cross-point-by-point-examination.html (Dec. 19, 2006).
'9' See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
398 917 F.2d 1476.
'99 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
2008]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
CONCLUSION
The controversy over the presence and placement of the cross in the Wren Chapel
is a matter of local and collegial interest, but it also represents a spectacularly teachable
moment. As we hope this Article has demonstrated, resolution of the controversy
implicates the deepest questions of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. These ques-
tions include the increasingly important relationship between concepts ofjusticiability
and the substantive content of the Establishment Clause, in part because President
Nichol framed his decision in terms of offense to those who may have been made
to feel like religious outsiders by the default position of the cross on the chapel's
altar table.4°°
Even when current doctrinal concerns about "personal injury" and "endorsement"
are pushed to one side, however, the presence of the cross in a prominent and highly
visible location in the chapel of a public college invites attention to the limits of public
agencies' authority to speak in a religious voice. If the Establishment Clause means
anything, it prohibits the government from acting for the purposes of sponsorship and
promotion of a particular faith tradition. Whenever an agency of the government
speaks in ways that connote such sponsorship, it must offer some theory of justifi-
cation independent of such an impermissible purpose. In the circumstances present
at William and Mary, a reflexive sense of "once a Christian school, always a Christian
school," simply will not suffice as a constitutionally adequate justification.
On the facts of the controversy at William and Mary, the only plausible candidates
for a theory of justification are concepts of "accommodation" and "acknowledgment."
The theory of accommodation, which requires a government-imposed burden on reli-
gious freedom as a trigger, can justify the provision of a college chapel, but it cannot
justify a symbolic Christian characterization of the space as its default configuration.
By the same token, because the absence or removal of that default configuration is no
burden on religious liberty, the compromise position of moving the cross off to one
side and permitting its display on the altar only during Christian worship, cannot pos-
sibly be seen as producing any constitutional harm. When Christian students need
the cross on the altar to focus their worship, they can move the cross to that place.
The theory of acknowledgment offers more possibilities to justify the prior place-
ment of the cross in the chapel, but none are sufficient. Historical accuracy is dis-
satisfied, not fulfilled, by placement of the cross on the altar table, where it would
not have been in the eighteenth century. Reverential acknowledgment as a concept
perhaps can do the trick, but such a concept has not yet become part of our law and
in any event has not been stretched this far even by its most avid judicial proponents.
Indeed, reverential acknowledgment of a sectarian symbol seems to us synonymous
with an establishment of religion.
4 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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What remains is the concept of cultural acknowledgment. This idea has roots
in the case law, but its boundaries are amorphous and uncertain. Whatever those
boundaries may be, the combination of a permanent default position at the center of
the chapel's worship space, and the unambiguous religiosity of the cross in this setting,
make the Wren Cross a poor candidate for the justification of cultural acknowledg-
ment. Arguments based on culture seem a pretext for reverence when the relevant
icon starkly transmits the message of Christian passion and promise, and the icon's
cultural background remains hidden from view.
We have no doubt that President Nichol could have been more thorough in the
reasoning that accompanied and followed his decision. If he had engaged in a more
elaborate process of constitutional evaluation, we expect that he would have come to
the same conclusion. At a public college, placement of a cross in such a position of
spatial, ceremonial, and visual prominence could not continue without putting the
school in violation of the Constitution.
In contrast, placing the cross off to one side of the chapel, in a display case
marked with a message about the role of this particular cross and of Bruton Parish
in the chapel's history, seems to us to be a defensible act of both cultural and historical
acknowledgment. This compromise solution, while perhaps not fully satisfactory to
the more ardent advocates on either side of the dispute, reflects appropriate sensitivity
to the full panoply of constitutional, historical, educational, and institutional consid-
erations. We hope that the rich insights that can be drawn from the struggle over the
cross at the College will endure long after adversarial tempers have cooled.
EPILOGUE
On February 12, 2008, Gene Nichol resigned, effective immediately, as president
of the College, after being informed by the College's Rector that his contract as presi-
dent would not be renewed in July 2008. Nichol's decision concerning the display
of the cross in the Wren Chapel played a prominent part in that resignation. Nichol's
public letter of resignation included the following:
I have made four decisions, or sets of decisions, during my
tenure that have stirred ample controversy.
First, as is widely known, I altered the way a Christian cross
was displayed in a public facility, on a public university campus,
in a chapel used regularly for secular College events-both vol-
untary and mandatory-in order to help Jewish, Muslim, Hindu,
and other religious minorities feel more meaningfully included
as members of our broad community. The decision was likely
required by any effective notion of separation of church and
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state. And it was certainly motivated by the desire to extend the
College's welcome more generously to all. We are charged, as
state actors, to respect and accommodate all religions, and to
endorse none. The decision did no more.
It is fair to say that, over the course of the past year, I have,
more than once, considered either resigning my post or abandon-
ing the positions I have taken on these matters-which I believe
crucial to the College's future. But as I did so, I thought of other
persons as well.
I thought of those students, staff, faculty, and alumni, not of
the religious majority, who have told me of the power of even
small steps, like the decision over display of the Wren Cross,
to recognize that they, too, are full members of this inspiring
community.
I have also hoped that this noble College might one day
claim not only Thomas Jefferson's pedigree, but his political
philosophy as well. It was Jefferson who argued for a "wall of
separation between church and state"-putting all religious sects
"4on an equal footing.' ' "°
A public letter to the William and Mary community, released that same day, from
Rector Michael K. Powell of the College's Board of Visitors, had only this to say
about the controversy regarding the placement of the cross in the Wren Chapel:
Many policies championed by President Nichol are fully em-
braced by the Board. We agree unflinchingly with the President's
efforts to make William and Mary a more diverse educational
environment. His achievements in this area will be the most
enduring part of his legacy. We will continue the pursuit with
vigor and will insist that all future presidents of the College do
as well.... [S]o there is no doubt, the Board will not allow any
change in the compromise reached on the placement of the Wren
Cross.'
4o Statement of Gene Nichol, President, William & Mary, to the William & Mary com-
munity (Feb. 12, 2008), available at http://www.wm.edu/news/?id=8672.
4"2 Statement from the William & Mary Board of Visitors to the William & Mary com-
munity (Feb. 12, 2008), available at http://www.wm.edu/news/index.php?id=8675.
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These events took place well after we delivered this Article at the law school in
October of 2007 and while the Article was in the editorial process. We offer no view
on the merits of Gene Nichol's tenure as president of the College. Those who focus
on the College's history will eventually be the judges of that. But we do believe that
the decision to change the placement of the Wren Cross was, as Gene Nichol sug-
gested in his letter, constitutionally correct. And we expect that any attempt to restore
the cross to its former default position, on the altar table of the Wren Chapel, would
invite costly and divisive litigation that the College would be destined to lose.
